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ABSTRACT 
Following the recommendations of the Contracts and Commercial Law 
Reform Committee 1975 section 8 was included in the Insurance Law Reform 
Act 1977, making arbitration clauses in insurance contracts unenforceable 
except in a small number of cases at the whim of the insured. It is submitted 
that this provision is overly restrictive. The justifications offered by that 
committee are analysed to examine whether any fundamental 
misunderstanding was the cause of the restrictive provision. 
The New Zealand Law Commission has proposed the repeal of section 8. This 
proposal, however, has been subject to some criticism. The author analyses 
this criticism in the context of the modem insurance climate. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises, with permission from the supervisor, approximately 16,000 words 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
This general focus of this paper is the law of insurance. The specific 
discussion is of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. The connection 
between these two areas in New Zealand at present is section 8 of the 
Insurance Law Reform Act 1977. Therefore, an examination of this remedial 
legislation in 1977, and the specific barrier established by that Act to the use of 
arbitration clauses in insurance contracts, is crucial to an analysis of insurance 
arbitration 
By following the historical development of the Act, and particularly the 
operative section 8, the author identifies the committee's justifications for the 
restrictive provision. It will be considered whether the arguments adopted in 
1977 are sustainable. This will allow for an objective assessment of the future 
of the section, whether repeal is necessary, and in what form. It must be 
remembered that whatever flawed reasoning the 1975 committee may have 
adopted, the Australian insurance law reform package initiated seven years 
later proceeded along a path almost identical to that leading to section 8. 
The justifications of the committee indicate a possible lack of understanding 
of arbitration, which has led to the minimising of a potentially effective 
resolution process. The effect of Scott v Avery 1 clauses, and arbitration clauses 
generally, will be discussed. This distinction is fundamental to understanding 
the concerns of the committee. It is proposed that a detailed examination of 
the features of arbitration and arbitration clauses may show that the 
justifications for a restrictive provision were unfounded, and that section 8 
has an extensive and far-reaching effect which cannot be maintained in the 
modem insurance climate. 
The paper continues a legislative analysis, and examines the process of reform 
initiated by the New Zealand Law Commission towards the repeal of section 
8 in the context of proposed arbitration legislation. The fundamental 
development in this reform which has an effect on arbitration agreements is 
the recommendation that a specific consumer protection provision be 
included in any future arbitration Act. 
1 (1856) 5 H .L.C 811; The effect of Scott v Avery, and general arbitration clauses, will be 
discussed in the context of the justifications of the committee for removing these clauses. 
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The paper questions the appropriateness of such provisions. Specific issues 
raised are whether consumers require particular attention, or whether they 
can exist equally, in a market like insurance, with commercial insureds. This 
involves an analysis of how consumers are perceived and treated generally in 
the insurance industry. The tentative conclusion arrived at is that consumers 
deserve special protection in insurance. The next critical enquiry is whether 
insurance consumers need to be singled out from consumers in other 
environments, and thus whether any proposed arbitration legislation should 
take particular account of the differences between insurance consumers and 
consumers in general. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the legislative machine has acknowledged 
an error in its operation and is directed towards ameliorating it. 
II NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION 
In New Zealand, section 8 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 provides 
that arbitration clauses, including compulsory arbitration clauses of Scott v 
Avery-form, are unenforceable by the insurer. In Australia legislation was 
passed by various states,2 but the most significant Australian provision now is 
section 43 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth).3 Tracing the evolution of 
these restrictive provisions will reveal the justification offered for enactment, 
and any grounds for possible future alteration. 
A Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee 
This committee, in its 1975 study of insurance law4 identified a number of 
'problematic' areas requiring the attention of corrective legislation. The 1975 
research acknowledged a number of matters worthy of urgent attention, and 
impliedly recognised that a broad analysis of the law of insurance might be 
sacrificed in the proposed remedial environment.5 The committee, from the 
2 Section 19 Insurance Act 1902 (NSW); Section 28 Instruments Act 1958 (Vic); Section 21A 
Insurance Act 1960 (Qld). 
3 Australian and New Zealand Insurance Reporter (CCH, NSW, Australia) 19-450. 
4 Report of the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee Aspects of Insurance Law 
Guly 1975). 
5 Above n4, 1; "We have not overlooked our obligation to consider insurance law in a more 
general way, and we intend to issue further reports. But it seemed to us that action in respect 
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outset, expressed concern with the manner in which insurers commonly draw 
insurance contracts in a way that is potentially unfair to the insured.6 
A primary concern of the committee was the inability of insureds to negotiate 
the terms of insurance contracts, and the discretion with which insurers relied 
on technical defences in defiance of a claim. The committee provided a useful 
reference to potential biases by accepting that although many New Zealand 
insurers were reputable and acted with integrity towards customers, "there 
are some insurers who are not reluctant to adopt a harsh or unconscionable 
attitude."7 Legislative reform was recognised as an integral step to controlling 
the activities of such insurers, with the associated notion that reputable 
insurers would "have nothing to fear from such legislation."8 
In this context of concern the committee addressed five discrete areas of 
insurance law, which ultimately constituted the bulk of the draft Act. These 
were immaterial mis-statements,9 compulsory arbitration,10 time limits for 
claims,11 agency issues12 and non-causative exemptions.13 
Of specific interest is the analysis and subsequent recommendations relating 
to compulsory arbitration clauses. The committee found that insurance 
policies commonly provided that disputes between the insurer and insured 
had to be arbitrated: 14 
"Arbitration as a means of determining disputes can 
undoubtedly have its merits. Matters in issue can be resolved 
relatively informally and where issues are technical there are 
of the particular matters to which we refer should not be held up by the need for a wider 
study." 
6 Above n4, 1. 
7 Above n4, 2. 
8 Above n4, 2. 
9 Above n4, 3. 
10 Above n4, 10. 
11 Above n4, 12. 
12 Above n4, 12. 
13 Above n4, 15. 
14 Above n4, 10. 
advantages in selecting an arbitrator with experience in the 
relevant field. But motives for insisting on arbitration can be 
4 
less worthy. An insurer by insisting on arbitration can defeat claims 
because it is more expensive to pay an arbitrator. .. than to employ the 
services of judges or magistrates who are of course paid by the state; 
because the process of appointing arbitrators and settling references 
can lead to delay; and because legal aid is not available for arbitrations. 
Perhaps the main attraction of arbitration for insurers is its relative 
secrecy, the fact that arbitrations are disposed of in private and not 
in open court. In the view of the committee if insurers wish to 
contest claims they must be prepared to do so in public and not behind 
the closed doors of an arbitration. The customers and prospective 
customers of an insurer are entitled to know how that insurer behaves 
towards those claiming under its policies, and in particular whether 
that insurer is in the habit of invoking technicalities to defeat 
meritorious claims." 
Some of the working paper information of the committee suggested that 
many New Zealand insurers were not enforcing arbitration clauses, or were 
including such clauses only in relation to the quantum of the indemnity. 
There was also evidence that certain insurers had been for some time party to 
an informal agreement with the New Zealand Law Society whereby insurers 
undertook not to insist on arbitration other than in relation to quantum. 
However, sustained enquiry with the NZLS has furnished no evidence of 
such an arrangement. 
B Insurance Law Reform Bill 
The Bill received 13 submissions, and was enthusiastically supported by the 
New Zealand Law Society and the Consumer Institute. There was some 
opposition from insurance interests, but not directly related to clause 8 (now 
section 8). 
Substantial debate surrounded the relationship between clause 8 and clause 
12, (now section 12) which provided that legal actions between an insurer and 
an insured were be dealt with by a judge alone rather than a judge and jury. 
It was argued that the elimination of the jury was to be regarded as a form of 
compromise for the withdraw! of arbitration rights that were found almost 
universally in insurance policies. It was proposed that the reason for jury 
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removal was the belief that juries have historically been negatively and 
disproportionately influenced by insurance company involvement in personal 
accident claims.15 
There is no doubt that in personal accident claims, insured defendants and 
their insurers may have felt vulnerable and subject to a jury prejudice towards 
arbitrarily high awards. Compulsory insurance ensured that the person at 
fault did not pay for the consequences of the wrong-doing.16 The difficulty 
with predicting the outcome of a damages case with any assurance was not 
aided by the vagaries of jury decisions, which added to the lottery-like 
appearance of the common law action. The fact of compulsory insurance was 
well known to juries, but the law said it could not be mentioned.17 
How can it be argued that a movement away from a jury trial offers a 
compromise of this risk in a claim by an insured against an insurance 
company. The risk being avoided is that juries award more if a party is 
insured. In a claim by an insured against an insurance company, the only 
potential risk is that a jury may prejudicially award for the insured, as the 
insurer has the deeper pocket. The author suggests that if sections 12 and 8 
are to be related by this type of compromise, then the proposed connection is 
incorrect. 
C Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 
This Act was passed as a direct result of the investigations and 
recommendations of the 1975 committee, and signified a major statutory 
encroachment into an area which is still principally governed by the common 
law. The ILRA 1977 provided specific rules relating to misrepresentation and 
non-disclosure. It also rendered invalid certain provisions m msurance 
contracts. Section 8 is the provision of interest: 
"8. Arbitration clauses not binding-(1) Subject to subsection (2) 
of his section, a provision of a contract of insurance-
15 NZPD, vol 410, 327, 2 June 1977. 
l6 G Palmer Compensation For Incapacity -A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and 
Australia (Oxford University Press, Wellington 1979) 27. 
17 Above n16, 27. 
6 
(a) Requiring differences or disputes arising out of or in 
relation to the contract to be referred to arbitration; or 
(b) Providing that no action or suit shall be maintainable 
upon the contract or against the insurer in respect of 
any claim or difference or dispute arising out of or in 
relation to the contract unless the issue, claim, 
difference, or dispute has first been referred to 
arbitration or an award in arbitration proceedings has 
been first obtained; or 
(c) Providing that arbitration or an award in arbitration 
proceedings is a condition precedent to any right of 
action or suit upon or in relation to the contract; or 
(d) Imposing any reference to arbitration or to an award 
in arbitration proceedings any limitation on the right 
of any person to bring or maintain an action or suit 
upon or in relation to the contract,-
shall not bind the insured 
(2) An agreement made by the parties to a contract of 
insurance after a difference or dispute has arisen out 
of or in relation to the contract to submit the 
difference or dispute to arbitration shall have effect as 
if subsection (1) of this section has not been enacted 
Although the substantive effect of this provision is to eliminate the effect of 
arbitration clauses, an election can be made by the insured to determine 
whether the dispute will proceed to arbitration. 
Section 8 (2) distinguishes between those agreements made to take out a 
contract of insurance which include an arbitration clause, and subsequent 
agreements made by parties to a contract of insurance after a dispute has 
arisen. The insured and insurer are free to enter into an agreement to resolve a 
dispute by arbitration which has arisen under the contract of insurance, but 
after the contract has been entered into.18 Once the insured and the insuring 
company have agreed that the dispute shall be resolved by arbitration, both 
parties are immediately bound by that agreement.19 
18 P Green, B Hunt Brookers arbitration Law and Practice (Brookers, Wellington, New Zealand, 
1993) 11-4. 
19 Above n18, Il-4. 
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III ANALYSIS OF THE 1975 COMMITTEE 
The paper has so far established the New Zealand legislative position in 
relation to arbitration clauses in insurance contracts. The author proposes a 
two-fold approach to the reasoning of the 1975 committee. First, it will be 
examined why the committee felt it was necessary to address compulsory 
arbitration agreements. The author suggests that arbitration agreements 
making arbitration compulsory were perceived as a vehicle forcing the 
insured involuntarily into arbitration. Whether the committee actually 
understood arbitration agreements, and Scott v Avery agreements, will be 
discussed. The second analysis complements the first. The committee, by 
rejecting the use of arbitration clauses, obviously perceived the use of 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism in insurance contracts as 
detrimental to the insured. Whether the committee had an adequate 
appreciation of the arbitration process will also be discussed. This will 
involve evaluating the reasons offered by the committee for opposing 
arbitration. 
A The Desire To Avoid A Mechanism Which Forces Insureds Into Arbitration 
The committee's only explicit reference to the mode of entry into arbitration is 
the statement, "[I]t is common for insurance policies to provide that any 
disputes between the insurer and insured must be arbitrated."20 
The words of the committee are not particularly helpful. The implication 
offered is that the committee was concerned with clauses which specified that 
arbitration was to be the initial process of dispute resolution under the 
contract. The following analysis will consider the different forms in which 
arbitration is specified in arbitration agreements as an initial process, and will 
consider whether a crucial distinction, which may have affected the 
committee, should have been more clearly stated in their reasoning. 
Arbitration agreements are a special kind of contract which prevail within the 
general framework of the law of contract and which in common with special 
contracts generally have developed distinctive features as a natural and 
20 Above n4, 10. 
8 
necessary incident of their province of operation.21 Arbitration agreements 
operate on two distinct levels: 
1 General arbitration agreements 
The essence of these agreements is procedural, providing a mechanism for the 
resolution of existing or future disputes. Two general characteristics are 
obvious: 
1 Agreements are independent of and distinct from the cause of action which 
establishes the claim referred. Therefore, liability is distinct from the 
agreement, which is often described as collateral. Aside from the arbitration 
agreement, a discrete cause of action exists which can be pursued in the 
courts, and which is neither established nor modified by the agreement. 
2 The existence of an arbitration agreement does not establish a defence to any 
action brought in disregard of the agreement to arbitrate. The failure first to 
arbitrate and obtain an award does not preclude the possibility of a remedy in 
the courts or a reference to the courts as a matter of procedure. The doctrine 
that the courts may not be ousted of their jurisdiction has the effect of 
rendering agreements void to the extent that they attempt to prevent a party 
from approaching the courts, even with regard to a matter which the parties 
have agreed to refer.22 
2 Scott v Avery clauses 
In this case a policy of marine insurance specified that in the event of loss any 
quantitative difference was to be referred to arbitration, "provided always , 
that no insurer who refuses to accept the amount settled by the committee 
should be entitled to maintain any action in law or suit in equity on this 
policy", until the matter has been decided by the arbitrators and "then only for 
such sum as the arbitrators shall award." The obtaining of the decision of the 
arbitrators was declared a condition precedent to the maintaining of an action. 
The questions before the House of Lords focussed on the true construction 
and legality of such a contract. 
21 Sir M.J Mustill and Stewart C. Boyd The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in 
England (Butterworths, London 1989) 16. 
22 D. Rhidian Thomas "Scott v Avery agreements" (1991) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial 
Law Quarterly 508,509. 
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Lord Cranworth accepted that the clear language of the contract indicated 
that the parties intended any difference between the insured and the 
commitee to be ascertained in a particular mode, and that until that mode had 
been adopted, no right of action existed.23 Lord Campbell rejected the notion 
that a contract of this type could be declared illegal on grounds of public 
policy, and suggested that it would be consistent with public policy to 
encourage that a company avoid an action which could lead to ruination, and 
refer a dispute to a domestic tribunal for speedy and cost-efficient 
determination. 24 
After Scott v Avery it is possible to contract specifically that a reference to 
arbitration and the making of an award shall be a condition precedent to 
liability, and that no action shall be brought until an arbitration has been 
conducted and an award made. Alternatively, and to the same effect, it may 
be agreed that the only obligation of a party to the contract shall be to pay 
such sum as may be awarded by an arbitrator. This is what is termed aScott v 
Avery agreement.25 
A Scott v Avery agreement goes further than simply providing that disputes 
shall go to arbitration. Arbitration is established, not as an alternative to the 
courts of law, but as a condition precedent to litigation, with the consequence 
that the absence of an award is a defence to any action brought without first 
having arbitrated. "The arbitration is not a mere procedural mechanism 
collateral to and independent of the cause of action but, to the contrary, it is 
integrated into and represents an essential and crucial component of the cause 
of action. The award creates rights and liabilities which do not otherwise 
exist, and this fact in turn explains why the absence of an award provides a 
good defence to an action. "26 
Scott v Avery clauses are composite agreements, and have been treated as two 
independent parts, one covenant to perform an obligation and the other to 
23 Above nl, 1136. 
24 Above nl, 1137. 
25 Above n21, 161. 
26 Above n22, 511; Edwards v Aberayon Mutual Ship Insurance Society Ltd (1876) 19 QBD 563, 
575. 
10 
arbitrate. This creates an arbitration agreement, but also a precondition to 
litigation. Although the arbitral process is the method by which the condition 
precedent to litigation is satisfied, the two parts can be treated as conceptually 
distinct. 27 
The practical effect of such clauses is that unless both parties consent to a trial, 
the dispute must be referred to arbitration.28 It is often said that a Scott v 
Avery clause 'postpones but does not annihilate the right of access to the 
court',29 as it does not prevent the parties from bringing a court action. An 
action in respect of a matter falling within the clause is not necessarily void 
and if a defendant waives the right to insist on arbitration, the action is not 
affected. The clause does not invalidate the action, but provides a defence; 
and since the effect of the condition precedent is to prevent any cause of 
action arising until an award has been obtained, the jurisdiction of the court is 
not ousted, since there is nothing to oust.30 
a Scott v Avery creates an option 
The existence of a Scott v Avery clause favours a pro-arbitration defendant in a 
legal action, as it renders it virtually certain that any dispute will be settled by 
arbitration.31 Where such a clause exists the defendant in the action has two 
options: 
The defendant can apply for a stay of the proceedings under the relevant 
arbitration legislation 
On the hearing of the application, all issues surrounding the applicability of 
the arbitration provisions can be dealt with, as well as the issue whether the 
clause is to have effect. If the clause does apply, the action will be stayed and 
27 Above n22, 511; The Scott v Avery precondition will predominantly be incorporated into an 
arbitration clause or agreement, but it could exist as a distinct clause in the contract, or as a 
physically distinct agreement. 
28 Above n21, 161. 
29 Above n21, 162; Freshwater v Western Australian Assurance Co Ltd(1933) 1 KB 515. 
30 Above n21, 162. 
31 PM B Rowland Arbitration Law and Practice (Institute of Chartered Accountants, London, 
1988) 34. 
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the matter can proceed to arbitration without further costs being incurred in 
the action.32 
A condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of action is created, giving the 
defendant a substantive defence to the claim. 
The plea of the clause in defence of the action operates as an absolute bar. A 
plaintiff bringing the action is met by the defence that such an action cannot 
be accepted until the condition precedent, the arbitration award being made, 
has occurred. The fact is that the plaintiff has no cause of action. The plaintiff 
will lose in the case and incur the costs of so doing. The arbitration will then 
have to be held unless the defendant has waived the Scott v Avery clause.33 
However, waiting and relying on the defence at the trial is contrary to 
fundamental notions of speedy and efficient justice on which arbitration is 
founded. The judicial approach to the stay where a Scott v Avery clause exists 
suggests that the courts would, if given an opportunity to choose between the 
options, favour a stay over the adoption of the defence.34 · 
Golding v London & Edinburgh Insurance Co Ltd 35 provides a useful judicial 
commentary on the factors involved in distinguishing between these options. 
That case involved an action under a policy of insurance which contained a 
Scott v Avery clause.36 The court implied that the earlier decision had not 
considered the ramifications of the plaintiff being left to meet the defence, and 
considered two ways of viewing a plaintiff's action without a prior award:37 
32 Above n21, 166. 
33 John B Dorter. Gary K Widmer Arbitration (Commercial) in Australia: Law and Practice (Law 
Book Co., Sydney, 1979) 72. 
34 For instance, if the court had been involved in the case at an earlier stage, in interlocutory 
proceedings. When establishing whether a valid defence exists, Australian courts have 
created problematic distinctions between conciliation clauses modelled on Scott v Avery, and 
arbitration clauses in Scott v Avery form. See R S Angyal "Enforceability of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Clauses (1991) 2 ADRJ 32, for a discussion ofAllco Steel (QLD) Pty Ltd v 
Torres Strait Gold Pty Ltd & Ors Unreported, SC of Qld, No 2742 of 1989, 12 March 1990, 
Master Horton QC. 
35 (1932) 43 L1 LR 487, CA. 
36 "The obtaining of an award shall be a condition precedent to any liability or right of action 
against the company." The company, applying to stay the action under the arbitration clause, 
appealed from a decision that Golding was entitled to bring an action upon the policy, 
notwithstanding the Scott v Avery clause. 
37 Above n35, 488. 
" One way of looking at it is this: 'Let him go on with this obvious 
defence before him and throw away all the costs of the action.' 
The other way is this: Act on clause 12 and stay the action. He 
12 
must then go to arbitration. [Liability] will be tested in the arbitration, 
and if he is entitled to the money he will get it, and if he is not 
entitled to the money he will not get it...'' 
3 Stay of proceedings 
The English Common Law Procedure Act 185438 and the judicial 
development of the discretion to order a stay established the foundation for 
the modern-day burgeoning of the arbitral institution.39 
In England the relevant legislation is s4(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950, which 
applies to the discretionary jurisdiction in domestic arbitration agreements, 
and sl of the Arbitration Act 1975, which applies to non-domestic arbitration 
agreements where the jurisdiction is mandatory, except for specified 
exceptions. 
The New Zealand legislation is limited to section 5 of the Arbitration Act 
1908, and no distinction exists between domestic and non-domestic 
arbitration agreements. However, the section does not apply to any 
arbitration agreement to which section 4(5) Arbitration (Foreign Agreements 
and Awards) Act 1982 applies. Therefore, prior to the 1977 Act, where there 
existed an arbitration agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration, and a 
dispute within the meaning of the agreement arose, the parties would be 
bound to the agreement. The court would seldom refuse a stay,40 although 
five prerequisites had to be satisfied.4 1 Complementing these five 
38 Common Law Procedure Act 1854 introduced a statutory jurisdiction to stay proceedings 
brought in disregard of an arbitration agreement. 
39 Above n22, 516. 
40 Above n18, D-21, discussing Codelfa-Cogefar (NZ) Ltd v A-G [1981] 2 NZLR 153, 157. 
41 Above n18, D-21, discussing Angus Construction (Wellington) Ltd v Smart Group 12/12/88, 
Davidson CJ, HC Wellington CP466/88 where it was held that there were five conditions 
justifying a stay: (a) There must be a valid arbitration agreement covering the disputed issue; 
(b) The application for stay must be made by a party to the agreement; (c) The applicant must 
have taken no steps in the proceeding; (d) The applicant must be ready and willing to 
arbitrate; (e) The court must be satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter 
should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the agreement. 
I 
t 
a 
e 
1 
C 
g 
s 
t] 
lI 
T 
tc 
cl 
Cl 
tJ: 
b: 
st 
42 
43 
St1 
44 
th, 
jui 
SU 
efl 
Cc 
ex 
es1 
be 
We 
ll!'l 
45 
12 
:tl 
)r 
:h 
s, 
d 
:t 
LC 
y 
ts 
a 
h 
e 
it 
13 
requirements was the wide judicial discretion to decide whether the dispute 
should remain within the jurisdiction of the court.42 
Further statutory conditions operated for a Scott v Avery clause. Section 5(4) of 
the Arbitration Amendment Act 1938 gave the courts the power to annul Scott 
v Avery clauses. In most cases, however, where the courts encountered an 
arbitration agreement with such a clause, a stay of proceedings would be 
granted.43 A stay would not be granted where the party attempting to invoke 
the clause had waived the right to rely on the provision, or where there 
existed a jurisdictional issue which challenged the right to arbitrate at all.44 
Therefore, in the case of a general arbitration agreement, even though the 
courts favoured a stay, there was no certainty that such an order would be 
granted, and in a specified range of situations the courts would not grant a 
stay. However, where a Scott v Avery clause existed, although the courts had 
the opportunity to use section 5(4), the granting of a stay was almost 
immediate. 
The effect of Scott v A very clauses on the judicial discretion to stay is critical 
to understanding the possible concerns of the 1975 committee. Scott v A very 
clauses in the more positive contemporary environment have provided for the 
creation of a bias towards the enforcement of arbitration agreements through 
the affirmative use of the statutory power to order a stay of legal proceedings 
brought in defiance of an arbitration agreement.45 Theoretically, where the 
statutory jurisdiction is discretionary, it is at least open to a court to refuse an 
42 Above nl8, D-2; B-15. 
43.M Gobbi and J P Gray "The Arbitration Alternative" (1991) NZLJ 270,271; see Jones v Eagle 
Star & British Dominions Insurance Co Ltd [1922] NZLR 336. 
44 Above nl8, D-23; For instance, an arbitrator has the jurisdiction to decide issues of fraud if 
the issue falls within the scope of the submission, or the parties have agreed to give that 
jurisdiction. Section 16(2) of the 1938 Amendment provides that the court may "give relief" in 
such circumstances. However, the court has the power to order that the agreement is of no 
effect and to give leave to revoke any such agreement to arbitrate. The Mackinnon 
Committee, Report of Committee on the Law of Arbitration, Cmd, 2817 (1927), considered the 
extent to which a Scott v Avery precondition has the effect of overriding the discretion 
established under the arbitration legislation. The effect of a Scott v Avery precondition would 
be to automatically consign the fraud to the arbitral forum. The concept of these agreements 
was not problematic to the Committee, but it was considered undesirable that they should 
impact so fundamentally on the relationship between arbitration and the courts. 
45 Above n22, 516. 
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order of stay and allow the action to proceed but subject to the possibility of a 
defence being raised. However, in practice this is unlikely. Where a Scott v 
Avery clause exists the discretion is exercised invariably in favour of an order 
to stay, thus indirectly forcing the parties into arbitration.46 
The reasoning behind this trend is that "an application for an order of stay is 
not a waiver of the defence, and it would be pointless and wasteful to allow 
an action to proceed when that action enjoyed no prospect of success because 
of an available defence." 47 A party ignoring the option to apply for a stay and 
relying wholly on the defence "is in peril as to costs." 48 
Therefore, the real practical significance of a Scott v Avery clause is to 
emphasise the arbitration agreement and confirm the obligation to arbitrate. 
The court will feel even more disinclined than usual to refuse the stay if the 
arbitration agreement is in the Scott v Avery form. Any judicial discretion is 
structured in favour of arbitration. This is perhaps true because the parties 
have agreed to a 'stronger form' of arbitration agreement than one without 
such a clause. Where the arbitration clause is not in the Scott v Avery form the 
defendant only has the right to apply for a stay under the relevant legislative 
provisions. The defendant cannot rely on such a 'bare' arbitration agreement 
as a defence. 
4 The possible effect on the committee 
The committee, with a clear position in relation to arbitration, attempted to 
qualify the use of this dispute procedure in insurance contracts by restricting 
the validity of arbitration clauses. However, as it has been explained, a 
significant distinction exists between general arbitration clauses and those of 
Scott v Avery form. 
The committee perceived compulsory arbitration clauses as the vehicle 
leading the insured into arbitration. The author suggests that the committee 
confused the distinction which can be made between the two types of 
arbitration clauses, and that although their probable concern was with Scott v 
46 Above n22, 522. 
47 Above n22, 522; Dennehy v Bellamy (1938) 2 All ER 262 (CA) at 264. 
48 Above n22, 522; Woodall v Pearl Assurance Co Ltd (1919) 1 KB 593 (CA). 
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Avery clauses, and the way in which those clauses favour the pro-arbitration 
party, the committe appears to have ignored the fact that arbitration clauses in 
general form do not necessarily have the same effect on the judicial discretion 
to stay. By attempting to avoid arbitration clauses which forced the parties 
into arbitration, the committee recommended a general provision which 
precludes the use of arbitration clauses in general, not merely those particular 
to that case. 
B Justifications For Rejecting Arbitration In Insurance Disputes 
The second point forwarded by the author is that the committee, as well as 
confusing the distinction between arbitration clauses, may have had an 
unnecessarily negative perception of the process of arbitration. The author 
will analyse the committee's statements on the motives behind insisting on 
arbitration to consider whether the arguments for rejecting arbitration are 
justified. 
1 Costs and Delay 
"An insurer by insisting on arbitration can defeat claims because it is more expensive 
to pay an arbitrator (or two arbitrators and an umpire) than to employ the services of 
judges or magistrates who are of course paid by the State; because the processes of 
appointing arbitrators and settling references can lead to delay;" 
The fundamental contention that an arbitrator must be privately paid is 
unchallengeable. However, the issue for consideration must be the extent to 
which the costs of the arbitrator can be analysed against the costs of counsel in 
a protracted court proceeding. Therefore, the issues of costs and delays are 
inextricably linked. The author proposes that if an arbitration is conducted 
efficiently and in a speedy manner, it is possible that a result will be delivered 
sooner, and at less expense to the insured, than if the claim was pursued in 
court. 
The committee obviously had a clear attitude towards arbitration procedure 
as an alternative to traditional judicial mechanisms of dispute resolution. The 
author, suggesting that this perception may have been based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the arbitration process, will describe what 
the committee appears to have considered, and what the author considers, to 
be the features of arbitration practice. It is submitted that the wide use of the 
16 
term 'arbitration' could have been a primary cause of confusion and negative 
attitude towards the process. The absence of definition may have led to 
misunderstanding and the rejection of arbitration as a legitimate mechanism 
for dispute resolution.49 
a What is arbitration? 
An arbitration is a procedure for the resolution of disputes. It is the reference 
of a dispute or difference between two (or more) people to a third person (or 
persons) nominated by the parties to decide it. It is entered into by agreement. 
Once entered, the parties are bound to proceed with it, unless they agree, or 
the court orders otherwise. In New Zealand, under the present legislation, an 
arbitration which is subject to the terms of the Arbitration Act 1908 and the 
Arbitration Amendment Act 1938 will only arise following a valid 
'submission'. so 
Arbitration, although existing as an "alternative" to the traditional litigation 
process, is not independent of court control. In New Zealand the jurisdiction 
of the High Court offers a formal check on arbitration practice. The common 
issues which require attention in this forum relate to enforcement of awards,51 
the setting aside of awards,52 the removal of an arbitrator53 and general 
procedural problems which require scrutinisation of alleged defects in the 
arbitration process.54 However, despite these legislative checks, there has 
been a definite trend in New Zealand in favour of enhanced party autonomy 
and, as a result, restricted judicial review of arbitration.55 
49 F Miller "Redefining Terms of Arbitration" (1990) NLJ, 827; The difficulty with using one 
term to describe a variety of distinct processes can lead to confusion, which arguably 
occurred in 1975. See discussion at 827 that the "word 'arbitration' needs either a statutory 
definition to categorise the various procedures and the status of the awards or, alternatively, 
'arbitration' must be treated as a Word of Art; where the true meaning is only clear when 
reference is made to the terms of the arbitration agreement." 
50 Above n18, 3; See the discussion that the wide definition in section 2 may have far-
reaching consequences and be over-encapsulating. 
51 Section 13. 
52 Section 12(2). 
53 Section 12(1). 
54 Arbitration Act 1908, ss 5, 6(2), 10; Arbitration Amendment Act 1938 ss 10, 15, 16. 
55 The trend towards a less intrusive approach has been acknowledged and reflected by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in CBI NZ ltd v Badger Chiyoda_(l989) 2 NZLR 669. See also K 
Stein "Correspondence" (1994) NZLJ 9, where the judgements of United Sharebrokers Ltd v 
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Arbitration in England and Australia operates with greater autonomy, due to 
the modern legislative emphasis in those jurisdictions.56 Prior to the 
Arbitration Act 1979, the English courts had the general power to review the 
decisions of arbitrators, and thus arbitration proceedings were rarely final. 
The 1979 Act removed the general powers of the courts to review awards and 
replaced them with a limited power to hear an appeal on a question of law.57 
Arbitration has a legitimate history as a formal institution. In fact, the use of 
arbitration is generally considered the rule rather than the exception for 
disputes relating to the quality of commodities, the building and construction 
industry,58 maritime matters,59 and commercial rent reviews.60 Arbitration is 
not limited to commercial causes, and domestic arbitration occupies a 
significant part of the dispute market. Thousands of disputes which would 
otherwise flood the courts or fail to be resolved, and which deal with claims 
as various as defective houses, insurance wrangles, professional negligence 
actions and the like are dealt with speedily and economically by arbitration.61 
The author suggests that, from the outset, this comprehensive acceptance of 
arbitration in modern society should have had a significant effect on any 
party considering a draconian reform like section 8. 
Landborough Estates Ltd & Others (Christchurch CP 298/89, Judgement, 18 May 1990, reported in 
NZVFSeptember 1990, Tipping J) and Smale & Brookbanks v Illingworth & Anderson and Fletcher 
Homes Ltd (Auckland No 1623/92, Judgement 18 December 1992, Thorp J) are presented as 
examples of the pro-arbitration stance of the New Zealand judiciary. 
56 R S French "Arbitration- The Court's Perspective" (1993) 4 ADRJ 279; England, Arbitration 
Act 1979; Australia, Uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts 1984 and 1985. A modem 
approach to the arbitral process in Australia was expounded in Qantas Ainvays Ltd v 
Dillingham Corp (1985) 4 NSWLR 113, 118: "It is now more fully appreciated than used to be 
the case that arbitration is an important and useful tool in dispute resolution. The former 
judicial hostility to arbitration needs to be discarded and a hospitable climate for arbitral 
resolution of disputes created." 
57 Section 1(2). 
58 Carol Powell "Alternative Disputes Resolution" Fast Track, Chapman Tripp Sheffield 
Young, Construction and Engineering Group Newsletter, issue 1, October 1993. 
59 For instance, the development of the Auckland Maritime and Insurance Arbitration Forum, 
with specialised procedures for arbitration and mediation. 
60 R Macdonald "Pendulum Arbitration-The answer to exaggeration in commercial rent 
review disputes" (1994) NZLJ 194. 
61 M Rutherford "Arbitration-Be There Dragons?" (1987) Law Society's Gazette, 2422. 
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b Flexibility of procedure 
Arbitration is founded on some general procedural assumptions. "(I)n the 
absence of express or implied terms to the contrary the arbitrator should 
adopt a procedure which is adversarial in nature"62 This is contrasted with an 
'inquisitorial' system, where the tribunal is the key party in discovering the 
solution to the dispute.63 An adversarial approach allows the parties to 
postulate alternative versions of the true position based on presentable 
material, upon which the arbitrator can make a decision. The procedure for 
the arbitration is often decided by the arbitrator, as long as it does not conflict 
with the express or implied terms of the arbitration agreement.64 It is 
common for trade or professional institutions to have their own arbitration 
rules, but capacity always exists for suitable individual rules for particular 
contracts to be drafted.65 It follows that the arbitrator can tailor the procedure 
to the requirements of the parties in dispute. An even wider discretion is 
granted where the contract makes no reference to institutions or forms.66 
Mustill and Boyd suggest that the adversarial system has three main 
characteristics: 
The procedural initiative and the responsibility for maintaining the 
momentum of the reference rests with the parties.67 The parties should 
62 Above n21, 16. 
63 The parties can of course decide that the arbitrator carries out their own investigation, as is 
indicated below. 
64 Above n43, 271; The suggestion is that if full advantage is to be derived from the 
arbitration process, any arbitration agreement must be carefully drafted to meet the needs of 
the parties, otherwise the courts may declare the agreement invalid or may subject the parties 
to the statutory arbitration procedures set out in the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act 
1908. 
65 R Coulson "Avoiding Litigation with Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1993) Risk 
Management 20, 24. This can allow the parties to control aspects such as the appointment of 
the arbitrator, procedural rules, any provisions like Scott v Avery clauses, what national law is 
to apply and other related issues. Arbitration in this sense is an exercise of the parties' 
contractual free will. 
66 Above n21, 15; In the absence of agreement the arbitrator is bound to follow the implied 
agreement of the parties, which involves taking into account the nature of the contract, its 
express terms, the commercial background, common trade practices of dispute resolution, the 
choice of tribunal and any preliminary procedures undertaken by the parties. 
67 Above n21, 17. 
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Although evidence is usually documented and communicated to the 
other parties and the arbitrator, evidence and argument are presented 
in a single hearing, at the conclusion of which the arbitrator will reach 
a decision on the basis of what has been presented and nothing else. 69 
The adversarial system is predominantly oral, with the majority of the 
evidence arising from witnesses attending in person, particularly 
where the dispute is complex. 
These general statements provide a useful platform from which to analyse the 
variety of procedures which may operate as alternatives or exceptions to the 
traditional understanding of arbitration. It is possible that the 1975 committee 
did not have the benefit of such an analysis . 
It has been traditionally considered that, unless otherwise prescribed, 
arbitration should proceed on broadly the same lines as a High Court action. 70 
The author submits that this may have been the assumption on which the 
1975 committee approached arbitration. As a general principle, this 
assumption is unsustainable. The perception that arbitration is identical to 
trial at law arises not from any express obligation to make the reference 
imitate a common civil action, but from the fact that lawyers often represent 
parties, and legally-trained professionals act as arbitrators, 
Clearly, an arbitration may involve a lengthy and formal procedure 
resembling a court proceeding,71 with attendant counsel and accompanying 
exchange of formal pleadings. However, this is merely a threshold from 
which more flexible procedures can be developed. For instance, in a 
commodities dispute, the arbitrator can look at the commodity in question 
and then, based on personal knowledge, issue the award.72 This quality 
68 Above n21, 17. 
69 Above n21, 17. 
70 Above n21, First Edition generally. 
71 Above nl8, 3. 
72 This is termed "look-sniff' arbitration. 
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analysis is the most informal type of arbitration and often involves "the 
mystic operations of smelling, tasting, touching and handling."73 The award 
is made on a judgement based upon this type of physical analysis. The scope 
for implementing an adjudication method more formal than this type of 
'summary justice' is extremely broad, qualified only by the requirement that 
any procedure must be consistent with the express or implied terms of the 
arbitration agreement.74 Therefore, it is possible that an appropriate dispute 
could be adjudicated on documentary evidence alone, with the possibility of 
dispensing entirely with a hearing. Alternatively, a decision could be based 
on such documents and written representations, pleadings and submissions, 
or documentary evidence incorporating a site visit. It is possible to hold a 
hearing with an agreed bundle of documents and no discovery; a hearing 
with prior exchange of expert reports, or joint reports on points of agreement 
and contention. Parties may also request a qualified party to simply offer an 
opinion on a matter in dispute to allow clarification of feasible issues for 
resolution, or merely to ascertain the likely result of a prospective action.75 
All these mechanisms have the capacity to limit the procedural formality 
mentioned above, and may improve the common perception of a process 
often considered a "wigless trial".76 The issue to be emphasised at this stage is 
that the procedural control of the arbitration can rest entirely with the parties. 
There is no requirement that parties must comply strictly with the formalities 
of court proceedings to ensure a valid arbitration. The arbitration statutes by 
which the flexible procedures described above are governed are the same 
statutes on which the committee based its reasonng in 1975. 
The author suggests that the recommendations of the 1975 committee may 
have been founded on the insular traditional assumptions of arbitration, and 
did take into account the potential for procedural flexibility in the arbitral 
73 Naumann v Nathan (1930) 37 L1 L Rep 359. 
74 Above n21, 18. 
75 H Astor and C Chay kin Dispute Resolution in Australia (Butterworths, Sydney, 1992) 242; 
The parties may not strictly consider this an arbitration, and the distinction between a 
reference to an arbitrator and to an expert is that an expert is not bound by statutory 
provisions, an opinion is not binding, and immunity is unavailable. However, depending on 
the definition of 'submission', the distinction may become blurred, as a reference to an expert 
may inadvertently become subject to Arbitration legislation. 
76 Above n61, 2423. 
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forum. The author has attempted to emphasise the disparity between what 
the committee may have assumed arbitration to be, and what in fact the 
process of arbitration involves, to allow an analysis of the specific 
justifications offered for the rejection of arbitration in insurance. 
The particular concerns relating to costs and delay are credible if it is assumed 
that arbitration is effectively a formal trial without a judge. However, the 
author has shown that such an assumption cannot, and has not, existed as a 
prescribed rule. 
Arbitration can produce speedy and cost-effective resolutions if the parties 
are willing to part with formality and arrange proceedings which allow 
unnecessary procedures to be bypassed. If the parties choose to conduct the 
arbitration as if it were a litigation, the hearing preparation will cost the same 
as that for litigation, but the hearing cost would be greater once the 
arbitrator's fees and additional support staff were met.77 
It is suggested that arbitration is a cheaper process than litigation where 
technical issues require resolution and lawyers are not involved, or if 
involved, as specialists chosen to narrow the substantive issues down, or 
present documentary evidence. 
Although considerable effort has been made to reduce court delays, the 
judicial forum will always struggle to avoid the impediment of mounting case 
loads. Ethical constraints on arbitrators operate to discourage the acceptance 
of references if a timely result is not anticipated. This restriction is not 
available in the courts. 
The specialist role of the arbitrator may remove the need to rely on expert 
counsel in an arbitration. If counsel are used, the need to labour initial and 
fundamental issues is lessened than if the adjudicator is a generalist.78 
Therefore, it is suggested that the concerns in 1975 as to costs and delay may 
have been ill-founded. Certainly, these issues are problematic in arbitration 
law, but not to the extent suggested in 1975. The author submits that the 
77 W P Jeffries "Alternative Dispute Resolution: The advantages and disadvantages from a 
legal viewpoint" (1991) NZLJ 156, 157. 
78 Above n18, 7. 
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overly restrictive approach to arbitration, manifested in the report of 1975, 
was based on an inability of the committee to approach arbitration as a 
flexibile process, and on general assumptions arising from archaich traditions. 
2 Legal aid 
"and because legal aid is not available for arbitrations." 
This justification of the committee is convincing, but only to a certain extent. 
Section 8 is an encompassing remedial provision which restricts the use of 
arbitration clauses in all contracts of insurance. It should follow that an 
argument adopted to implement such a reform should relate to all parties 
affected by the section. However, legal aid is not readily available to every 
party involved in a court proceeding. 79 The author submits, therefore, that 
such reasoning is not persuasive in the argument that arbitration should be 
categorically restricted in insurance contracts. 
3 Privacy 
"Perhaps the main attraction of arbitration for insurers is its relative secrecy ... if 
insurers wish to contest claims they must be prepared to do so in public and not 
behind the closed doors of an arbitration. The customers and prospective customers of 
an insurer are entitled to know how that insurer behaves towards those claiming 
under its policies .. " 
The committee suggests that the motives of insurance companies in relation to 
their customers are often dubious and dishonourable. However, it involves a 
significant conceptual progression to achieve this implication from the 
common practice of insisting on arbitration. 
The extensive party control over arbitration procedure referred to above 
would include the opportunity for parties to specify for representatives and 
support networks to become involved in the reference. Therefore, any party 
not wishing to attend arbitration alone would not have to. 
79 For instance, although the Legal Services Act 1991, section 19 provides that civil legal aid is 
prima facie available in most proceedings, eligibility is tested by stringent personal and 
financial qualifications (ss 29-32). There is also a further restriction on the eligibility of 
corporate and unincorporate bodies (s 27). General restrictions also operated in 1975 under 
the Legal Aid Act 1969, with the scope of assistance limited in specified circumstances (s15), 
and always subject to a means tested threshold (s19). 
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The privacy of arbitration avoids unfortunate publicity and preserves issues 
of commercial sensitivity. This of course is lost on appeal, but the relatively 
minor number of cases proceeding that far (and the capacity to include no 
appeal clauses) make this a less significant consideration.80 
In contrast to a litigated proceeding, where a party will almost always require 
counsel,81 arbitration places no significant constraints on representation. 
Parties can 'have their day in court' without the restrictions of civil procedure. 
This will also have significant implications for costs. 
Arbitration may be particularly attractive to disputing parties wishing to 
preserve their relationship. The flexibility of the arbitration presents the 
parties with an opportunity to create an hearing far removed from the 
confrontational and aggressive courtroom forum. This is significant for 
commercial entities operating in a competitive environment where the option 
of categorically rejecting association with specific parties in the market is 
unavailable. The nature of insurance relationships precludes simple 
disassociation on dispute. Often parties will have a history of transactions 
prior to a dispute, and it cannot be expected that such a relationship will be 
ignored. The adoption of an arbitration model suited to the needs of the 
parties has a greater chance of 'patching things up' than a journey through the 
courts. 
The author submits that the privacy of an arbitration may actually operate as 
a fundamental benefit to insurance disputants, rather than a feature favouring 
clandestine and dishonest insurers. 
If the committee was genuinely concerned with informing insurance 
customers of the claims-paying practices of insurers, it is not difficult to 
anticipate that a mechanism in the form of a standardised rating scheme, 
which would be available to all parties,82 would have served this purpose far 
more effectively than a comprehensive ban on insurance arbitration. 
80 Above n31, 15; This is especially so under the English 1979 Act and the guidelines in regard 
to granting leave to appeal laid down in Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd. The Nema 
[1982] AC 724. 
81 Above n31, 18. 
82 This could operate as a rating of the claims-paying practices of all insurance companies, 
with an emphasis similar to the Insurance Companies (Ratings and Inspections) Act 1994. 
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C Conclusion 
The author has attempted to show that many of the justifications offered in 
1975 for reform are based on fallacy and misunderstanding. 
The tenor of the report suggests that an element of urgency surrounded the 
research and subsequent recommendation. The speed with which the report 
was transformed into draft legislation is greeted in parliamentary debate with 
an element of surprise.83 The remedial climate favoured specific reform 
which may have led to the sacrifice of a wider perspective. The language 
adopted by the committee indicates that the recommendations were clouded 
by the questionable activities of a small number of insurers.84 The desire to 
neutralise the perceived 'unfair' bargaining position between insurers and 
insureds appears to have arisen out of some subjective assumptions about 
arbitration as a discrimminatory dispute resolution process. 
The operating powers of section 8 are significantly wider than simply 
abrogating the effect of a Scott v Avery clause. It also overrides a fundamental 
stipulation that disputes will be referred to arbitration. An acceptance that 
section 8 is useful thus requires not only an acceptance that Scott v Avery 
clauses are a vice, but also that arbitration as an institution is a vice. This of 
course depends on the proponents perspective of dispute resolution, but 
nevertheless results in quite a significant conceptual leap. 
The author respectfully submits that the committee showed a significant lack 
of judgement in its recommendation of clause 8. It is desirable that the law be 
cast in a way that alternative dispute resolution is encouraged. This is 
particularly the case with arbitration, where the processes involved are 
hallowed by time and experience, and are tried and accessible. Any rule of 
law restricting access to these, or which creates a barrier to party autonomy, 
should be regarded with suspicion. 
However, when identifying the fundamental deficiencies in the reform 
commenced by the 1975 committee, it must be considered that seven years 
after the remedial legislation was passed in New Zealand, the insurance law 
83 Above n15, 326. 
84 Above n4, 2. 
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reform package initiated by the Federal Law Commission in Australia in 1976 
contained a provision which imposes even wider restrictions than section 8. 
That commission also emphasised a concern with equality of bargaining 
power and the relative fairness of insurance contracts. The result of the 
commission enquiry was the emergence of two reports,85 both of which 
contained draft Bills which were accepted and passed into law in 1984 as the 
Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act 1984 and the Insurance Contracts Act 1984. 
The investigation emphasised the problems and difficulties faced by 
consumers, with the common perception that arbitration had the capacity to 
seriously disadvantage consumers.86 However, criticism was aimed at an 
investigation which identified consumer concerns but ultimately 
recommended little or no difference in the treatment of consumer and 
commercial insurance. It was suggested that this could create major problems 
for commercial insurers and their customers, and careful monitoring was 
expected. 
The recommendation adopted similar reasoning to the 1975 committee in 
New Zealand,87 highlighting increased cost, delay in payment, the avoidance 
of meritorious claims, and the avoidance of bad publicity as reasons to reject 
compulsory arbitration. It was suggested that the insurance industry raised 
no objection to the abandonment of arbitration clauses.88 
8S Australian Law Reform Commission Report 16 Insurance Agents and Brokers; Australian 
Law Reform Commission Report 20 Insurance Contracts. 
86 Richard Thomas Guidebook to Insurance Law in Australia and New Zealand (CCH, NSW, 
1981), 80. 
87 A Tarr, K Liew, W Halligan Australian Insurance Law (2ed, The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, Australia) 235. In fact, the limited reference to the arbitration reform in this text, 
which spans 1 1/2 pages, quotes the relevant passage from the 1975 committee as authority 
for the development of section 43. 
88 Above n85, Report 20,204; The wording of the report is almost identical to that of the 1975 
committee: "Arbitration of disputes may have value in certain areas of the law. In the context 
of insurance, however, there is a widespread view that reliance on compulsory arbitration 
clauses leads to cost, delay in payment and even to the avoidance of just claims. Legal aid is 
not usually available in arbitration proceedings. Yet these may be more costly than 
proceedings in court. An insurer which wishes to rely on a technically valid but 
unmeritorious defence may, by insisting on arbitration, avoid the damaging publicity which 
would attend such a tactic if it were employed in court. The presence of an arbitration clause 
may discourage a claimant from pressing his claim and may equally discourage an insurer 
from offering settlement on a claim which it regards as being in the least doubtful. Even 
where the insurer is bound to meet the costs of the arbitration, it would be preferable to allow 
the insured to take his dispute straight to court. The insurance industry has raised no 
objection to the abandonment of arbitration clauses. They should be rendered ineffective." 
26 
As a result of these recommendations section 43 was introduced. Section 43(1) 
provides that a provision in a contract of insurance which requires, authorises 
or otherwise provides for differences or disputes in connection with the 
contract to be referred to arbitration, or limits rights conferred by the contract 
on the insured by reference to an agreement to submit a difference or dispute 
to arbitration, is void.89 
The section does not apply to an agreement to submit a dispute or difference 
to arbitration if the agreement was made after the dispute or difference arose 
(s43(2)). 
IV SECTION 8 IN PRACTICE 
The author is aware that some parties involved in the insurance industry 
consider section 8 to exist as a barrier to arbitration in only a very small 
number of cases where arbitration is desirable. The perception is that the 
section 8 obstacle is anomalous, as most insurers are never particularly 
anxious to proceed to arbitration.90 However, it appears to be a circular 
argument to suggest that arbitration does not occur because insurance 
companies are not interested in pursuing it as an option, when the possible 
reason for this lack of interest is that insurance arbitration has been effectively 
rejected by statute. To suggest that repeal will not alter this situation because 
arbitration is not presently in favour seems to commence this circular 
argument again.91 It is difficult to understand the reasoning that arbitration is 
not commonly used because disputes simply cannot be aligned to that form of 
dispute resolution. The lack of use must surely not be primarily for that 
reason, but the fact that a legislative barrier to arbitration clauses has been 
created. 
89 J Morgan The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Longman Professional Statute Guide, Sydney, 
1986) 2. 
90 Correspondence with Mr Trevor Roberts, Gillespie Young Watson, 04-07-95. 
91 Correspondence with Mr Alan Deerness, Manager, Claims Technical, State Insurance, 20-
07-95, where it was indicated that section 8 has had little effect on the practices of that 
company as they rarely receive requests for disputes to be arbitrated in a formal manner. 
Arbitration conditions in State policies require agreement between both parties. The 
suggested problem was that it was difficult to find a significant number 0£ disputes meeting 
the criteria to fit within options between litigation and negotiation. It was accepted that this 
could change as options developed and became more widely accepted. 
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There are two areas where the operation of section 8 may be particularly 
relevant: 
A Choice of Law 
The ILRA 1977 applies generally to all contracts of insurance. Section 15 of the 
Act prohibits contracting out, but the Act does not contain a specific 
prohibition against the parties choosing some law other than the law of New 
Zealand to govern their contract. The effect of this may be to avoid the 
operation of the Act.92 It is common for remedial legislation like the 1977 Act 
to counter specific loopholes of this type by specifying for conflict of laws. 
This particular Act did not do this. 
As a general comment, it would appear that choice of law clauses could be 
adopted by insurers to avoid the restrictive effects of section 8. 
It is possible to contract out of a provision by stipulating that the contract be 
subject to the law of another country. 
The general principle guiding which systems of law govern a contract of 
insurance is the intention of the contracting parties. If the contract expressly 
states that it is to be governed by a particular system of law, then that law will 
generally be applied to the contract. There is, however, some authority to the 
effect that the parties may only select a system of law which has a substantial 
connection with the contract.93 Where the contract is silent, the proper law of 
the contract is for judicial determination. This can involve ascertaining the 
unexpressed intention of the parties, or, alternatively, accepting the system 
with which the transaction has the greater connection.94 
Choice of law clauses are common where a contract is of an international 
nature, in particular where the parties are not all present in NZ. However, it is 
not uncommon for parties to attempt to avoid particular statutory provisions 
which regulate contracts by choosing some other system of law.95 
92 D St Kelly and M L Ball_Principles of Insurance Law in Australia and New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Australia 1991) 19. 
93 Above n92, 20. 
94 Above n92, 20. 
95 Above n92, 20; For instance section 8 ILRA 1977. 
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Generally, the courts of most countries will give effect to a provision in a 
contract selecting the system of law to govern that contract if the parties have 
so selected, it is bona fide and legal, and there is no public policy reason for 
avoiding the choice.96 The clause will not be invalid merely because the 
proper law of the contract would have been different if the clause had not 
been included. Nor will it be invalid merely because there is no factual 
connection between the contract and the country whose law is selected.97 For 
instance, many contracts are governed by English law even though none of 
the parties is based in England and the contract itself has no connection with 
England. 
However, the courts of a forum will almost certainly not permit a choice of 
law clause to be used to circumvent provisions in domestic statutes which 
cannot otherwise be contracted out of, where there is no other commercial 
justification for the choice of law."98 
The potential to invoke choice of law clauses to avoid section 8 has been 
recognised above. The scope of the 1977 Act may allow for this to occur. 
However, the remedial legislation in Australian insurance law did not 
overlook this point. 
Section 8 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ensures that it is not 
possible to avoid restrictive provisions like section 43 by stipulating for a 
96 NZLS Seminar "Conflict of Laws- The International Element in Commerce and Litigation" 
(November 1991) 63; see also Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co Ltd [1939] AC 277 
(PC) at 290. 
97 Above n96, 63. 
98 Above n96, 63; The implication is that if a New Zealand insurer wanted to get around 
section 8 and give effect to an arbitration clause by specifying for another system of law, it 
might get caught by the 'no other commercial justification' qualification. 
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particular system of law.99 Section 8(1)100 extends the scope of the Act to 
contracts or proposed contracts of insurance, the proper law of which is the 
law of the State or Territory to which the Act applies. "Section 8(2) provides 
that where the law of a State or Territory would, but for a contrary 'express 
provision', be the proper law of the contract, then the proper law is the law of 
the State or Territory. The 'express provision' is rendered ineffective."101 
This provision does not strictly affect the choice of law itself, which may be 
effective, in accordance with general contractual rules, in relation to issues not 
covered by the Act. 
However, a recent Australian decision102 has undermined the effect of section 
8 by holding that an English choice of law clause, an 'express provision' 
within the meaning of section 8(2), was to be disregarded but that the 
inclusion of an arbitration provision which specified for arbitration in 
England was sufficient to provide that the law of England was the proper law 
of the contract. The arbitration clause was held to indicate that the parties 
intended English law to apply, and was not an express provision which had 
to be disregarded under section 8(2). 
99 Above n85, Report 20, para 15; The commission clearly described the potential problem it 
was attempting to address: "If nothing were said concerning the territorial extension of 
legislation altering the law relating to insurance contracts, the effect of that legislation might 
possibly be avoided by the expedient of inserting a choice of law clause in the relevant 
contract. There are two ways in which such an attempt to evade the operation of the 
legislation might be avoided. The intended territorial applicatiion of the Act might be set out 
in terms. Alternatively, the insertion of a choice of law clause might be rendered ineffective. 
The latter is the method which was chosen .. [in the] Trade Practices Act 1974. For the sake of 
consistency, that is also the method which has been adopted in the draft legislation .. " 
lOO Section 8(1) [Proper Law of Contract] Subject to section 9, the application of this Act 
extends to contracts of insurance and proposed contracts of insurance the proper law of 
which is or would be the law of a State or the law of a Territory in which this act applies or to 
which this Act extends. 
8(2) [Where express provision does not apply] For the purposes of subsection (1), where the 
proper law of a contract or proposed contract would, but for an express provision to the 
contrary included or to be included in the contract or in some other contract, be the law of a 
State or of a Territory in which this Act applies or to which this Act extends, then, 
notwithstanding that provision, the proper law of the contract is the law of that State or 
Territory. 
lOl Above n92, 20-21. 
102 John Kaldor Fabric Maker Pty Ltd v Mitchell Catts Freight (Aust) Pty Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Ins Cas 
60-960. 
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Therefore, section 8 of the ILRA 1977 can be avoided by the use of choice of 
law clauses, ensuring that arbitration clauses in New Zealand insurance 
contracts could be effective. The 1977 Act has no equivalent to the Australian 
provision referred to above. It is submitted that this is a further indication that 
the section should be repealed. It is inconvenient and contrary to commercial 
expectations to anticipate that choice of law clauses will be adopted simply 
because of a legislative error. A provision which encourages this should be 
repealed. 
B Reinsurance 
The ILRA 1977 applies generally to all contracts of insurance. Therefore the 
Act must apply to New Zealand contracts of reinsurance. The author accepts 
that an international reinsurance contract may be governed by a choice of law 
clause and thus be subject to another system of law. However, it is in the 
interests of all New Zealand insurers to have reinsurance disputes resolved in 
New Zealand. Reinsurance is expanding in New Zealand, and it would be 
undesirable to allow an industry to develop within restrictive boundaries of 
dispute resolution. 
Arbitration clauses in reinsurance contracts are very cornmon.103 An 
arbitration clause, which is usually part of a large commercial agreement, is 
the most common source of arbitration.104 It would be reasonable for a New 
Zealand insurer to want to specify in an arbitration clause than any dispute 
arising out of the reinsurance contract would be resolved in New Zealand. 
However, such a qualification as to the choice of arbitral forum could 
realistically offer some fundamental problems to an offshore reinsurer. Any 
agreement for future arbitration would not be binding on a New Zealand 
insurer as section 8 makes such agreements unenforceable. The ·one-sided 
nature of such an arrangement essentially creates an environment where 
reinsurers would refuse to enter contracts where the arbitration clause 
specified a New Zealand forum. 
103 National Report from United Kingdom "Freedom of Contract and Choice of Law in 
Insurance" (AIDA IXth World Congress, Sydney, Australia, 14-18 August 1994) 339. 
104 0 Chukwumerije Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books, 88 
Post Road West, CT 06881, USA, 1994) 29. 
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Therefore, a rule which was hailed as protecting consumers almost 20 years 
ago could potentially have the effect of making New Zealand insurers less 
competitive in the international reinsurance market. Not only could parties 
attempt to avoid arbitration in New Zealand, the Australian authority of John 
Kaldor 105 for avoiding choice of law clauses by including a foreign arbitration 
clause in the contract, may make it far easier for offshore entities to avoid 
arbitration in New Zealand, thus excluding New Zealand arbitrators from the 
international market. 
V LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
A Early Development 
Can this restrictive statutory modification of arbitration clauses be justified in 
the current commercial climate? Recent research into this possible legislative 
error suggests that it cannot. 
Initial commission research in this area106 was prompted by substantial 
changes to arbitration in various commonwealth jurisdictions.107 The 
commission emphasised the importance of ensuring that dispute resolution 
processes operate effectively in contemporary social conditions, "a matter 
close to the heart of the work being done on the structure of the courts."108 
A primary concern of the Commission was whether the question of 
arbitrability was for the courts109 or required the attention of comprehensive 
arbitration legislation.110 Acknowledging that specific New Zealand statutes 
lOS Above n102. 
106 New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary Paper No.7 "Arbitration". 
107 Particularly English legislation, on which the New Zealand legislation is modelled, and 
equivalent legislation in Australia and Canada and elsewhere, as well as the international 
model produced by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). 
108 Above n106, vii. 
109 In New Zealand the court's powers to exclude questions of fraud from arbitration are 
provided for in s16 1938 Amendment Act. 
llO The example offered is the Quebec Arbitration Statute of 1968 which provides that 
"disputes over the status and capacity of persons, family matters or questions of public order 
cannot be submitted to arbitration." 
32 
expressly excluded arbitration, including statutes giving exclusive jurisdiction 
over aspects of their subject matter to a specialised court or tribunal,111 and 
statutes governing the entire jurisdiction of a tribunal,112 the commission 
referred specifically to section 8.113 The public interest justification for having 
disputes dealt with openly had essentially led to insurance companies being 
singled out for particular treatment, and had also led to the confusing 
arrangement that section 8 restrictions were limited to agreements to arbitrate 
disputes which may arise in the future, not present disputes. The consumer 
protection issue was recognised as relevant, but there was uncertainty 
whether specific consumer protection was required, or whether the issues 
arising could be dealt with under general contract law. There was, however, 
little confusion over the future of the section:114 
"Overall the absolute prohibition does seem to be somewhat 
anomalous and it may be doubted whether the provision is 
justified in the context of a modern policy of encouraging 
arbitration." 
A statutory provision for arbitrability was preferred by the commission, as a 
mechanism to reduce the restrictions on arbitration to a minimum.115 The 
reduction of other legislative obstacles to arbitration was also considered. 
Section 8 of the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 was declared in need of 
repeal, but the restrictions on arbitration in the Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 
and statutes establishing specialised courts and tribunals were considered less 
problematic as some of the advantages of arbitration are retained in those 
fora.116 
111 For instance, Labour Relations Act 1987; Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
112 For instance, Disputes Tribunals Act 1988. 
113 Paragraph 58. 
114 Above n113. 
115 Paragraph 192. 
ll6 Above nl15. 
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This signifies the first formal recognition that an overly restrictive provision 
may have been mistakenly entrenched in statute, and is the initial step to 
alteration in the context of general arbitration reform. 
The commission has also indicated some disfavour with the restrictiveness of 
section 8 in research independent of the arbitration study.117 
The most authoratative statement on the future of section 8 has arisen in the 
report of the New Zealand Law Commission,118 which recommends a draft 
Arbitration Act to replace the present arbitration legislation.11 9 The 
framework of the new scheme is largely based on the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration adopted in June 1985 by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and endorsed 
in December 1985 by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. The proposed law involves some modifications to the Model Law 
and some additional provisions applicable to domestic arbitrations. 
The proposedAct is very short, with the bulk of the new provisions detailed in 
schedules. Schedule 1 is essentially the Model law. Domestic arbitrations will 
generally be governed by schedule 1 as supplemented and modified by 
schedule 2, which can be opted out of. Parties to international arbitration 
agreements may opt into the additional provisions of schedule 2. Therefore, 
the provisions of schedule 2 will apply, unless otherwise agreed, to domestic 
arbitrations and only if agreed, to international arbitrations. 
In its report, the commission acknowledged their previous examination and 
made a more definitive statement on the future of section 8:120 
117 New Zealand Law Commission Preliminary Paper no. 11, "Unfair" Contracts. Many of 
the recommendations of this report formed the foundation for the developments giving rise 
to the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. 
ll8 New Zealand Law Commission Report No.20, "Arbitration." 
119 The draft Act from the report is now the Arbitration Bill ,117-1, and has been referred to 
the Justice and Law Reform Committee; Parliamentary Bulletin, 95.18, 25 September 1995. 
The major changes in the bill relate to the ordering of sections 1-5, an omission of table of 
contents for the schedule, and the Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1940 and Penal Institutions Act 
1954 are not included in the Fourth Schedule as have been amended. Clause 9 remains 
unaffected. Information received in correspondence with Vanessa Inskeep, Law Commission, 
23-11-95. 
120 Above nl 18, para 238. 
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"As noted in our discussion paper we found this provision 
somewhat anomalous given its limited scope. Although our 
consultation suggested that this provision has not substantially 
affected practices in the insurance industry, there is some 
irritation within the industry at being singled out, and there was 
a general endorsement of the proposition that the consumer 
protection issue should be addressed more broadly and 
directly." 
This provides the reader with an indication of the potential developments in 
the arbitration arena. The express emphasis of the Commission in insurance 
arbitration is on consumer protection. It is necessary to address the relevant 
recommendation to objectively assess whether the treatment of this issue is 
adequate, or even desirable. 
B Recommendation121 
9 Consumer arbitration agreements 
(1) Where 
(a) a contract contains an arbitration agreement, and 
(b) a person enters into that contract as a consumer, 
the arbitration agreement is enforceable against the consumer 
only if the consumer, by seperate written agreement, certifies 
that, having read and understood the arbitration agreement, the 
consumer agrees to be bound by it. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, a person enters into a 
contract as a consumer if 
(a) that person enters into the contract otherwise than in 
trade, and 
(b) the other party to the contract enters into the contract 
in trade ... 
This provision empasises that the voluntariness with which parties enter a 
contract can be quite different, depending on whether the parties are business 
entities or consumers. Significant considerations in this distinction are the 
121 Above nl18, 139. 
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notions of inequality of bargaining power, contracts of adhesion, and the 
concept of true consent. The Commission acknowledged legislative 
developments in Australia and the United Kingdom, where the governing 
provisions in this area highlight quite different concerns. 
The Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 1988 (UK)122 defines a consumer 
by interpreting the context of the contract and the nature of the goods 
transferred. A potential problem with this type of definition is that 
distinctions on the nature and use of particular goods may become blurred. 
This has already occurred, as the scope of the Act has been extended to 
business buyers of consumer goods.123 
The Australian Trade Practices Act 1952124 focusses on the nature and the 
purpose of the goods purchased, but also adds a further dimension of a 
$40 ,OOO monetary limit. 
Clause 9, by relying on the 'in trade' distinction, includes an element of both 
of these established models. The author supports the ignorance of a monetary 
limit, which could result in the creation of some artificial distinctions between 
purchases. "The formula recommended is designed to maintain a reasonable 
degree of commercial certainty, to ensure a reasonable degree of informed 
consent to arbitration, and to provide a broad approach (as compared to s8 of 
the Insurance Law Reform Act 1977) to protect genuine and informed 
consumers. "125 
The reference to a contract that "contains an arbitration agreement" retains an 
emphasis similar to that existing under section 8. It recognises that an 
arbitration clause may have seperate status, and limits the scope of the section 
to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
An arbitration clause will only be enforced where the consumer signs a 
seperate agreement certifying an acceptance and understanding of the 
122 Section 3. 
123 R & B Customs Brokers Co Ltd v United Dominion Trust Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 321, CA. 
124 Section 4B. 
125 Above nll8, para 245. 
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arbitration agreement. Unlike the UK provision, the clause does not state that 
the certification by the consumer is to occur after the dispute has arisen. The 
implication is that the consumer can agree to be bound by the arbitration 
agreement at the time on entry into the contract, but the clause does not 
preclude certification after a dispute has arisen.126 
1 Potential implications 
Section 8 will be replaced by clause 9 of the bill, if enacted. The potential 
advantage of this clause is that it will offer an insurer and an insured an 
opportunity to clearly enunciate their position in relation to dispute 
resolution. Arguably, much of the uncertainty arising from section 8 will 
disappear. 
The discussion of arbitration agreements above has emphasised that Scott v 
Avery clauses operated in favour of a pro-arbitration party by ensuring that 
parties would be judicially encouraged into arbitration. Although section 8 
attempted to address the operation of these clauses, that provision extended 
the ban to all arbitration clauses. Clause 9 makes no distinction between forms 
of arbitration agreements. The clear emphasis in the modern clause is that 
parties will not be forced into arbitration in any circumstances. Therefore, this 
provides certainty that parties will not be judicially encouraged to proceed to 
arbitration because a contract to which they are a party contains a clause 
specifying that arbitration is a condition precedent to liability. 
This development signifies a responsible approach to consumer protection 
which was not evident in earlier legislation. The consumer focus of the 1975 
committee resulted in a perceived power imbalance favouring insurers to 
such an extent that it was recommended that non-traditional dispute 
resolution be avoided. It is clear that this wisdom is now being revised, with 
an emphasis on arbitration as a preferred method of resolving disputes. 
Therefore, it is interesting that in less than two decades arguments for a 
126 Above nl18, para 240 summarises the approach in the Consumer Arbitration Agreements 
Act 1988 (UK) which provides that, where a person enters into a contract as a 'consumer' an 
arbitration cannot be enforced against that consumer except (a) where the consumer has 
given written consent after the dispute has arisen, or (b) where the consumer has submitted 
to arbitration under the clause (whether in respect of the present or another dispute), or (c) 
where the court makes an order that it is not detrimental to the interests of the consumer for 
the dispute to be referred to arbitration having regard to, in particular, the availability of legal 
aid and the expense which may be involved in arbitration. 
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particular form of protection have resulted in quite diverse recommendations. 
A previous ban on arbitration is now being replaced by an encouragement of 
the practice with specific protective mechanisms. 
This is consistent with a modern desire for speedy and cost-effective dispute 
resolution. The 'first wave' of alternative dispute resolution which was 
emphatically accepted in the 1970s has been replaced by an inquisitive and 
critical approach to the package of resolution processes available. This has 
resulted in greater awareness of the pitfalls of arbitration, mediation and 
associated methods of resolution, and a revised perspective of the benefits of 
these schemes. The reform of arbitration law is ideally suited to such 
informed times. It will provide tangible encouragement to the development of 
all forms of ADR, and a defined mechanism for promoting the use of 
arbitration. 
The repeal of section 8 and the replacement by clause 9 will offer consumers 
protection in the arbitration market. Commercial parties, including 
commercial insured's, have not been offered equivalent protection. This may 
be a recognition that although some specific protection must be offered to 
certain parties, the wide restrictions of section 8 are inappropriate. The 
implication is that parties operating in a commercial environment do not 
require explicit protection, and are assumed to be capable of looking after 
themselves. 
The author suggests that it is overly simplistic to suggest that parties with 
commercial experience should be restricted to traditional forms of dispute 
resolution without choice, which was the result after 1977. The recent bill 
identifies consumers as 'special' parties. Business entities are therefore 
provided with a mandate to regulate their own arbitration agreements, and 
decide individually whether they are bound by them, independent of 
protective provisions like clause 9. 
It is submitted that the focus of consumer arbitration provisions is on 
ensuring the parties do not have to go to arbitration, while the lack of detail 
regarding commercial parties is intentional to ensure the parties have the 
option to do so. 
2 Criticism 
38 
A specific purpose of legislative reform is to consider the repeal of dated or 
onerous provisions which cannot be sustained in the contemporary 
environment. However, reform will always incite criticism from parties who 
accept the established rule of law. This has occurred in the context of 
arbitration reform.127 The author presents this as a useful point of entry into 
an examination of the consumer arbitration provision. 
This criticism identifies arbitration clauses as oppressive, creating a barrier 
between the citizen and justice.128 The common objections identified relate to 
costs (legal aid is not available), and privacy. Proponents of this view favour 
the retention of provisions like section 8 which recognise explicitly the 
"injustices resulting from arbitration clauses,"129 and reject the current 
movement of encouraging arbitration. 
The criticism of the proposal on consumer arbitration agreements 1s 
summarised in three points:130 
1 "It is based on the rather naive premise that if a consumer signs a 
document saying he has read and understood something he has in fact 
done so ... It is surprising to see the Commission recommended the 
revival of this outmoded and ineffectual consumer protection 
technique. The proposal should be replaced by something less feeble, 
preferably a simple provision along the lines of the various statutes ... 
making arbitration clauses void or unenforceable. 
2 "A more meticulous draftsman would have realised the need to 
except from the operation of the new provision those arbitration 
clauses w_hich provide machinery to determine issues (such as 
contested rent reviews) not otherwise justiciable. 
127 D Dugdale "Arbitration as oppression" (1992) NZLJ 135. 
128 Above n127, 135. 
129 Above n127, 135. 
130 Above n127, 136. The author has emphasised the word 'not' in point 3. From a reading of 
the criticism of Dugdale, it must be suggested that the word 'not' has been mistakenly 
included in the text of (1992) NZLJ 136. 
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3 "The proposal is unsatisfactory because it removes from an insured 
any protection along the lines of section 8 in cases where the insurance 
contract is not entered into by the insured "in trade". The reasons for 
the present protections in the insurance law of Australia and New 
Zealand apply as much to the position of an insured in relation to his 
business as to that of an insured who is a private consumer. .. The 
statement that section 8 did not substantially affect practices in the 
insurance industry is true only of some insurers who before the 
enactment of section 8 were prepared to waive arbitration other than in 
relation to quantum and is certainly not true of all insurers. The fact 
that a statutory protection irritates insurers is not, one would have 
thought, a particularly cogent argument in favour of removing it." 
The author interprets the above criticism as stating three simple points. First, 
consumers are not well-informed parties and are vulnerable to exploitation. 
Second, a distinction can be made between arbitration arising in various 
industries. Finally, commercial and consumer insureds deserve similar 
protection. These three points will be addressed seperately, but for 
consistency of argument the third criticism will be raised prior to the second. 
VI ANALYSIS OF CRITICISM 
A Consumers Well Informed? 
Arguably, an ability to listen to the consumer is the most important issue 
today facing industry, generally, and the insurance industry, in particular."131 
The desire to respond to the challenge of consumer demands arises in the 
context of self-regulation. A warning is issued, by referring to the Australian 
banking and life insurance industries, to accept this challenge. It is suggested 
that " .. during the eighties these industries in many cases failed to listen to 
what their customers (and their representative bodies) were saying. As a 
consequence they have had many solutions thrust upon them through 
legislation. "132 
l31 Peter Corrigan "Consumer Responsiveness and the Strategies or the General Insurance 
Industry" (1994) 19 The Insurance Record of Australia and New Zealand, 22. 
132 Above n131, 23. 
40 
There must be a desire in the general insurance industry to resolve consumer 
problems long before the need arises for external interference. In New 
Zealand, some 'interference' has already been formalised. This may provide 
some insight into how consumers are perceived in specific areas of insurance. 
1 Insurance regulation 
Laws regulating and supervising those engaged in the business of insurance 
are generally enacted in the interests of certainty, to ensure that funds created 
by contributions are held, managed and disbursed in a prudent and proper 
manner. Protection against insolvency is usually the main objective of 
insurance regulation.133 
However, solvency may not be the sole objective of regulation. Other reasons 
may be equity, for example ensuring reasonableness of premiums and 
equitable treatment of policyholders; fairness to policyholders; and social 
goals. Social goals may be political, for example about democracy, liberty and 
protectionism; economic, for example about socialisation of risk, freedom of 
enterprise, and capital accumulation; or moral, for example about reduction of 
gambling, risk control, loss prevention, and avoidance of corruption.134 
Major legislative alterations in the area of company regulation and financial 
reporting standards have impacted on the insurance industry, either directly 
or indirectly. In addition, 1994 saw the passage of two new insurance-specific 
statutes.135 This area has traditionally been subject to the regime operated by 
the Insurance Companies Deposits Act 1953, which aims to provide security 
for policyholders who may have claims against an insurer, and to protect the 
insured from insurer insolvency.136 
133 J R McDermott "A Legal Audit of the Insurance Companies Deposits Act 1953, LLM 
Research Paper, VUW 1994, 21. 
134 Above n133, 21; refers to Professor S L Kimball "The Purpose of Insurance Regulation" 
(1960-61) 45 Minnesota Law Review, 471 . 
135 Insurance Intermediaries Act 1994, Insurance companies (Ratings and Inspections) Act 
1994. 
l36 Above n133, 1. 
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A government review of the regulatory regime in New Zealand, including the 
ICDA 1953,137 recommended that the requirement of deposits with the Public 
Trustee be discontinued in favour of a rating system. A rating system would 
provide information to the public on the ability of an insurer to meet its 
liabilities.138 The Insurance Companies (Ratings &Inspections)Act 1994 is a 
direct attempt to give effect to the Brash report's recommendations. 
a Brash McLean report 
An examination of the specific references and allusions to consumer concerns 
in the review indicates the general attitude towards insurance consumers and 
regulation. 
The stated objective of a prudential regime is policyholder protection. The 
nature of a prudential regime depends on the business activity in which 
institutions are engaged. Strict regimes have classically bound the operation 
of banks in New Zealand. In comparing banks and insurance companies the 
latter were found to be notably different as "they are not primarily dependent 
on very short-term deposits for their funding, and so are vulnerable to 
rumour in a less sudden and catastrophic way; they are not central to the 
payments system; and the failure of one insurance company does not usually 
impact directly on others. "139 Therefore, the unique nature of the insurance 
industry provided justification for a specialised prudential regime. 
Risk is the fundamental concept on which insurance exists. Although the 
assets of all financiers contain some element of risk, the liability faced by 
insurers is far more unforseeable. Standard company reporting requirements 
do not cover significant contingent assets and liabilities, and therefore do not 
provide an adequate assessment of the claims-paying ability of an insurance 
company. 
The type of insurance information made publicly available is often 
incomprehensible to all but the skilled professional. "For a consumer who 
purchases relatively small quantities of insurance, the cost of obtaining an 
137 D Brash, I Mclean "A Prudential regime for Insurance Companies" (Wellington, New 
Zealand, 1993). 
138 Abqve n133, 1. 
139 Above n137, 4. 
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accurate assessment of an insurance company's ability to meet possible claims 
is prohibitive." 140 
Fire and earthquake insurance usually operates on a 12 month cycle, with 
payment generally securing a service in advance of necessity. For this reason 
"it is too late to return a faulty insurance product to an insurer after the 
disaster has struck."141 
The report acknowledges the attraction of fraudulent parties to the insurance 
industry. "Entry costs are low, and by the use of a glamorous name and glossy 
promotional material, silver tongued salesfolk can persuade otherwise 
sensible citizens to part with premiums." 142 
The suggestion offered is that if the Companies Act provisions are not 
adequate, and it is for all practical purposes impossible for the ordinary 
policyholder to protect his or her own interest, then arguments for a specific 
prudential regime may be justified.143 
The report sounds a caution against an acceptance of overseas experience, 
where prudential regimes provide a formal guarantee of the payment of 
claims. "The danger is that the existence of a prudential regime will lead the 
public to believe that the government is guaranteeing their claims."144 The 
implication is that policyholders will have little incentive to analyse and 
invest with sound companies, and avoid marginal firms with low premiums, 
if it is perceived that an ultimate guarantee exists. 
A rating is considered necessary as the "public should be able to rely on the 
fact that a licence is current as indicating that the company has met all criteria, 
and any risk of failure is minimal"145 
140 Above n137, 4. 
141 Above n137, 4. 
142 Above n137, 5. 
143 Above n137, 5. 
144 Above n137, 6. 
145 Above n137 8. 
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When dealing with overseas examples and evidence, the report questions 
why the various supervisory agencies overseas do not provide better 
information to consumers, to facilitate the making of informed decisions 
when purchasing insurance.146 
Undigested reports provided to the supervisory authorities in the UK and 
Australia are available to the public, but the consumer does not have the 
expert analytical skills to adduce information from them. "Therefore, the 
absence of such public judgement by the supervisory authorities arises 
because it is inappropriate for governments to rate products in any market 
according to quality. In other words, the lack of consumer information is not 
accidental but inherent in the system."147 
The report assesses the relative advantages and disadvantages of public and 
private sector rating. The latter is accepted as significantly reducing the moral 
commitment on the government to compensate the policyholders of failed 
insurers.148 The reasoning is that well-informed customers cannot expect to 
be compensated for bad decisions.149 
Private sector agencies may facilitate the decision-making process by 
providing an opportunity to avoid those companies whose claims paying 
ability is weak or suspect. The report emphasises the need to make the 
"ratings comprehensible to the lay person."150 A simple rating would "be quite 
intelligible to the commercial property owner and indeed to the residential 
property owner. If a property owner wanted to insure with a company of 
lower claims paying ability, perhaps because of a lower premium, he or she 
could do so, but would be aware of the greater risk of default in the event of a 
major catastrophe."151 
146 Above n137, 9. 
147 Above n137, 9. 
148 Above n137, 9. 
149 Above n137, 10. 
150 Above n137, 11; 1he report refers to Standard & Poors example of rating on a 5 grade 
system, from 'very secure, secure, satisfactory, may be adequate, and vulnerable'. 
lSl Above n137, 22. 
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The report noted that overseas regimes are reliant almost entirely on 
government action rather than the response of well informed customers. The 
nature of a New Zealand rating system would ensure government awareness 
of an unsatisfactorily rated company, but would "leave it to current and 
prospective policyholders to seek better cover .. "152 
The recommendations focus on the removal of any perceived government 
obligation to guarantee the safety of investments made by private citizens, 
and rather insist that investors are well informed.153 In conclusion it is stated 
that the recommendations are designed to greatly enhance the ability of 
consumers to choose wisely when purchasing earthquake or fire insurance, 
and at the same time reduce the implicit guarantee of the Government. 
b Insurance Companies (Ratings and Inspections) Act 1994 
Part I of the Act requires that insurance companies must have a current rating 
from an approved rating agency of their ability to pay claims. Part II provides 
for a system of inspection that gives power to the registrar of companies to 
inspect documents for the purpose of determining whether an insurance 
company is unable to pay its debts.154 The application of the Act extends to 
all insurers carrying on insurance business in New Zealand, but some 
exceptions apply.1ss 
A rating is a formal indication of an insurer's ability to pay present and future 
claims. A rating is to be expressed as a symbol, with explanatory 
cornrnents.156 Every insurer to which the Act applies is required to have a 
current rating from an approved agency by December 1995. Failure to comply 
with the section is an offence under the Act carrying the possibility of a fine 
152 Above n137, 18. 
153 Above n137, 21. 
154 Above n133, 1; This is identified in the long title" An Act to provide for-a)The rating of the 
claims paying ability of insurers in relation to the business of insurance except life 
insurance;and b)Inspections of insurance companies of doubtful slovency. " 
155 For instance, insurers who carry on business only with members of a group of companies 
of which the insurer is a member; the business of life insurance carried on by the insurer (s 4); 
an insurer who is not involved in disaster or general insurance may elect not to be rated 
under this act (s 9(1)). 
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not exceeding $100,000.157 The insurer must, within 5 days of issue by an 
approved agency, deliver to the Registrar a certificate of rating from the 
agency, as well as a copy and explanation of the rating scale used.158 An 
inspection of this information is open to the public for a prescribed fee.159 
Before entering into or renewing a contract of insurance an insurer (or 
intermediary) must disclose to the insured in writing the current approved 
rating,160 the scale of rating, and any 'credit watch warning'.161 Disclosure 
must occur where the rating given to an insurer is lower in value than the 
immediately preceding rating given to the insurer, and in this case public 
notice pursuant to the requirements of section 3 is also mandatory.162 
Insurers not required to be rated must also, before entering into or renewing a 
contract of insurance, disclose to the insured their non-rated status.163 
If the disclosure requirements of section 10 have not been complied with the 
insured may cancel the contract within 20 days of the contract being entered 
into.164 Provision is made for the default of premiums if cancellation is made. 
The primary emphasis of the Act and the initial report has been outlined 
above. The motives surrounding this form of regulation are positive, but it is 
possible that the mechanism imposed is unrealistic. Although insureds are 
encouraged to become informed participants in insurance transactions, an 
immediate transformation is unlikely. What does this regime suggest about 
insurance consumers? 
The report constantly refers to the 'consumer', 'sensible citizen' and 
'policyholder', and refers to a desire to protect and inform such parties, and 
157 Section 5. 
158 Section 6. 
159 Section 7. 
l60 Section 10. 
161 This is a new concept, and refers to any indicator used by a rating agency considering a 
downgrading of an insurer. 
162 Section 8. 
163 Section 12. 
164 Section 11. 
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allow for objective decision-making when confronted by unscrupulous 
entities and confusing information. The necessary implication from the report 
is that a ratings scheme will provide a mechanism by which consumers will 
be able to guard against fraudulent parties, and will be able to assess and 
compare the respective features of highly and lowly rated, and unrated 
companies. 
The report clearly anticipates that the position of consumers will be 
significantly altered by a ratings regime. The suggestion made is that well-
informed customers will not make bad decisions. The purpose of such a 
scheme is to encourage consumers to base decisions on the claim-paying 
ability of an organisation. Is this a sustainable proposition? 
Will the majority of consumers understand the conceptual reality of a rating, 
and further, act on such information? Although the insured is bound to 
receive rating information, it will be interesting to monitor whether parties 
take significant notice of, and allow decisions to be affected by, this material. 
The report suggests that as informed participants in the insurance relationship 
consumers will, through the availability of rating information, be in a position 
to affect the market perception of an insurer. This is particularly clear when 
reference is made to insureds leaving an insurer, risking loss of premiums, 
and causing a flight of custom by other insureds.165 Again, careful monitoring 
is required to ascertain whether this eventuates. 
Clearly, a major assumption is made of the understanding of consumer 
insureds, and the abundance of informed consumers, in the insurance market. 
The fact that an inspection of section 6 ratings is made possible by section 7 of 
the Act may provide little comfort to consumer advocates attempting to create 
an accessible insurance industry. Similar criticism can be aimed at the duty to 
disclose current rating, scale of rating and credit watch warning details under 
section 10. The problems associated with a duty to disclose are among the 
most obvious and controversial in insurance relationships, and to enforce the 
disclosure of further technical information places an identifiable conceptual 
burden on consumers. It is not unreasonable to expect that consumers will 
simply accept this with the mass of other general information they receive in 
165 Above n137, 18. 
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an unqualified manner. If an insurer is downgraded by an approved agency, 
this information is to be publicly notified in newspapers and the Gazette 
(section 3). Further, the consumer insured is expected to make an informed 
decision between rated and non-rated insurers, as both types of status require 
disclosure at the time of contract formation. If a rated insurer is accepted 
without disclosure, the consumer is then offered the opportunity to cancel the 
contract. The author's concern is whether the majority of consumers would 
even entertain the notion of termination on such grounds. 
Despite these apprehensions, the Ratings legislation and preceding research 
operates on an 'informed consumer' basis, anticipating a party with the 
capacity and acumen to locate and assess technical information relating to the 
claim-paying ability of an insurer, and terminate an insurance relationship for 
non-disclosure. This is a healthy picture which the law of insurance must be 
seen to encourage. The grounds on which the Act is founded are positive. It 
may be too early to predict whether consumers will follow the lead of the 
legislation. 
The author accepts that the modern insurance climate, highlighted by the 
ratings scheme, clearly expresses the desire of parliament for consumers to be 
independent, informed, and aware of their individual relationship with an 
insurer. This may be considerably distinct from the common perception of 
consumers as powerless and exploitable. It is unrealistic to expect an instant 
transformation of consumer attitudes. However, the law should be cast to 
encourage this transformation to occur as quickly as possible. Clause 9 of the 
arbitration bill, which offers the consumer an opportunity to reject an 
arbitration agreement, is a useful example of this required encouragement. 
B Commercial and Consumer Insureds 
The author submits that the fundamental assumptions evident in the Ratings 
scheme are created by the treatment of consumer and commercial insureds as 
like entities. The Act makes no express distinction between commercial and 
consumer insureds, and in fact seems to expect that all insureds exist on an 
equal level. In practice it cannot be expected that such parties will operate 
identically in the market. The necessary conclusion is that they are worthy of 
special protection due to their status in the insurance market. 
48 
It is submitted that consumer and commercial insureds operate in the 
insurance market at different levels and with different emphasis. Protections 
adequate for one party may be inappropriate for another. This has been 
recognised in some recent developments in New Zealand, particularly the 
establishment of the office of the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman. A 
further development has been the potential encroachment of the Consumer 
Guarantees Act on the law of insurance. 
1 The New Zealand Insurance and Savings Ombudsman 
The development of this scheme is directly attributable to the failure of the 
insurance market to provide any realistically effective dispute resolution 
procedures for consumers.166 The recognised limits of the Disputes 
Tribunal,167 both in terms of disputed sums168 and the ability to offer expert 
resolutions for consumers with any form of consistency, has been a significant 
factor in searching for insurance-specific resolution systems with a wider 
jurisdiction than the in-house complaints procedures offered by insurance 
companies. 
Influenced by the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau (UK) and the Australian 
Insurance Industry Complaints Council, the New Zealand scheme offers a 
free and independent dispute resolution service for non-commercial insureds. 
The scheme is supervised by representatives from the Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs and an insurance industry board. 
The operation of the Ombudsman is governed by the Terms of Reference. 
These provide definitional guidance, details of complaints procedure, and the 
powers and limits of the Ombudsman. 
Any complaint must relate to personal or domestic insurance in New 
Zealand. The Ombudsman has no authority to act where the participating 
166 Consumers Institute "Insurance Against the Insurers" (1992) 309 Consumer 3. 
167 Ministry of Consumer Affairs "Review of the Disputes Tribunals From a Consumer 
Perspective" (Wellington 1994). 
168 Maximum of $5000. 
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insurer complained against is not registered as a member of the scheme. Some 
time constraints are imposed on the complaints process.169 
Further fundamental limitations are imposed to restrict abuse of the scheme. 
The amount claimed cannot exceed $100,000.170 A complaint cannot relate to 
an insurer's assessment of risk, the setting of premiums, investment strategies, 
policy renewal and cancellation, and conditional approaches to cover.171 
The Ombudsman retains considerable discretion of procedure adopted for 
assessing complaints, although some general guidelines are offered.172 It is 
necessary for a complainant to endorse the requirements for privilege, 
confidentiality and return of documents.173 
A unique opportunity exists for an insurer to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman and pursue the complaint in a court. This can occur where the 
contentious issue has important consequences for the insurer's business, or 
involves a significant point of law. 174 
As at 30 June 1995 the ISO office database recorded 515 consumer contacts, 
falling into the respective areas of health (8%), savings (2%), life (32%) and 
Fire and General (58%) insurance.175 The adoption of the ISO in New Zealand 
has created the potential for a very significant gap to be filled in the insurance 
industry. As expected, some preliminary hurdles will need to be addressed. 
Of particular concern are the restrictions in the Terms of Reference176 which 
place in doubt the fundamental fairness of the scheme. These relate 
specifically to the questionable independence of the ISO from industry 
organisations, the inability of complainants to decide when the ISO should be 
169 The insurer must initially have attempted to resolve the complaint internally, (para 3.ld). 
The complainant then has two months to approach the Ombudsman, (para 3.le). 
170 Para 3.la; However, some flexibility exists to increase this sum. 
171 Para 3.2; 3.3. 
172 Para 4.1. 
173 Para 8.1; 8.2. 
174 Para 6.1. 
175 Unreported statistics received prior to release in cooperation with the ISO. 
176 S Rogers "Industry Lapdog or Consumer Champion? A Review of the Insurance and 
Savings Ombudsman Scheme" LLB(Hons) Research Paper VUW 1995. 
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approached, the coverage of additional complainant costs, the lack of national 
accessibility, and the ultimate requirement of public accountability. 
2 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 
The formal acceptance of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 into New 
Zealand Law on 1 April 1994 identified a significant coup for advocates of 
consumer protection schemes, and was proclaimed as 'great news for 
consumers' by the Consumers Institute.177 However, the impact of the 
legislation is yet to be felt, as various areas of goods and services provision 
become encapsulated within the scope of the Act's guarantees. 
Insurance is such an area. The extension of the Act to include services 
broadens parameters for protection considerably. However, a warning is 
sounded against expectations that the CGA will command a primary role in 
insurance contracts. The nature of the protection is untested, and it is possible 
that the Act may have an insubstantial effect on insurance law.178 Regardless 
of this danger, it is arguable that complementary actions in contract, tort, 
statute and an underlying duty of utmost good faith could provide the 
necessary 'teeth' for the CGA to impact on insurance. At the very least, the 
guarantees offer a mechanism for balancing the bargaining power between 
insurer and insured.179 
The definition of 'service' includes a "contract of insurance, including life 
assurance and life reassurance."180 A 'consumer' is defined as someone who 
"acquires from a supplier goods or services ordinarily acquired for personal, 
domestic, or household use or consumption." 1s1 
177 JC Skinnon and L Sligo Companion to the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (Butterworths, 
Wellington, New Zealand, 1994) v. 
173 J D. McManus "The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993: Issues in Insurance Law" LLH(Hons) 
Research Paper VUW 1995, 2. 
179 Above n178, 3. 
180 Section. 2(1). 
181 Section 2(1). 
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The Act provides that the service will be carried out with care and skill.182 A 
further guarantee is that the service is reasonably fit for any purpose, and of 
such nature and quality that it can reasonably be expected to achieve any 
particular result that the consumer has made known to the supplier before or 
at the time of making the contract for the supply of the service.183 
There is a guarantee that the service will be completed within a reasonable 
time184 and that a reasonable price will be charged for the service, unless the 
price is fixed by the contract.185 
Essentially, the CGA simply creates powers for consumers to pursue statutory 
rights in the courts. There are no provisions for penalty or sanction. However, 
the Act does provide boundaries in which industry bodies can operate, and in 
conjunction with established common law and statutory actions, may 
emphasise the status of the consumer insured in the marketplace. 
These two developments indicate that some distinctions do, and need to 
continue to, exist between consumer and commercial parties in a market like 
insurance. However, when making this distinction it is necessary to find for 
consumers an acceptable balance between protectionism and freedom of 
contract. 
The author submits that the above concern,186 that a repeal of section 8 will 
create a distinction between consumer and commercial insureds, is difficult to 
justify in the context of the modem insurance environment. It is inherent in 
the insurance industry that such a distinction will exist. 
C Insurance Consumers v General Consumers 
An issue derived from Dugdale's second criticism is that, in the context of 
arbitration, there may be some justification for approaching particular 
182 Section 28. 
l83 Section 29. 
l84 Section 30. 
185 Section 31. 
186 Expressed by Dugdale above n127, 136. 
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industries differently.187 It has been established that is common for consumer 
insureds to be offered specific protection due to their non-commercial status. 
The author proposes to analyse whether consumers in the insurance industry 
exhibit certain characteristics which may require specific treatment 
independent of general consumer regulation. This may confirm whether a 
general arbitration clause for consumers is adequate, or if a more industry-
specific provision is required. 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 is a useful starting point. (The Act is 
discussedbelow) The Act does not make a distinction between consumers in 
different industries. The implication is that significant difficulties could arise 
if general protection provisions were varied to accomodate different market 
contexts. The fact that a recent and widely acclaimed piece of legislation fails 
to make this distinction may suggest that consumers in arbitration legislation 
should be treated similarly. 
However, it has been suggested that the nature of insurance services makes it 
difficult for general legislation like the CGA to combat the common problems 
faced by consumer insureds. 
The difficulty with applying the new law to insurance services is related to 
the intangible and uncertain nature of insurance. Whereas tangible consumer 
services188 attempt to achieve a specified result, a breach of an insurance 
service often involves long-tail liabilities, substantial loss, and formal 
proceedings for resolution.189 Prima facie, the appropriateness of the CGA is 
questionable. "Banks, lawyers and insurance companies tend to require 
specialised legislation rather than general legislation such as the CGA. 
Nevertheless the Act is drafted to capture all such services. While it seems 
clear that consumers need legislative protection in their dealings with the 
supplier of services that have no physical end product, the post-sale consumer 
statute seems the wrong place for it. Specialised statutory treatment for 
insurance services may be the desirable altemative."19° 
187 Dugdale makes the point that contested rent reviews are an example of matters which 
should automatically be arbitrated, and thus should not be subject to a provision like clause 9. 
188 For instance, automobile repairs, plumbing etc. 
189 Above n178, 4. 
190 Above n178, 5. 
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Therefore, although the Act expressly acknowledges the incorporation of 
insurance services, it can be argued that guarantees in relation to those 
services may not develop in any significant manner. The Act's failure to 
distinguish between consumers may not be completely authoritative. 
The author acknowledges this concern, but suggests that, as above, the 
legislature has expressly indicated the manner in which consumers should be 
considered. This Act suggests that the concerns of all consumers in relation to 
the purchase of goods and services, including insurance, can be addressed by 
a comprehensive and encompassing scheme. This legislative message, for the 
sake of consistency, should not be ignored by future reform. The arbitration 
reform package appears to have considered this trend. 
Despite the influence of contemporaneous legislation, it would still be 
possible to justify an insurance-specific arbitration provision if it could be 
established that insurance consumers differ substantially from general 
consumers. 
Although it has been suggested that the insurance industry has a unique and 
independent existence,191 it is necessary to examine the issues facing 
consumer insureds before it can be asserted that they require particular 
attention. 
1 Standard form 
Standard forms for selling insurance is a world-wide phenomenon, due to the 
economics of selling cover on the basis of standardised risks. The 
development of standard forms restricts the freedom to contract. Insurers are 
unwilling to depart from the standard form, particularly in fields of mass-
produced insurance. Buyers of those insurance products have to 'take it or 
leave it.' 
2 Necessity 
Insurance is a necessary aspect of modern existence. Associated with general 
concepts of property law and ownership is the notion of security of that 
ownership. Parties in possession or ownership of goods have always 
191 Above n137, 4. 
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attempted to secure some assurance to compensation in the event of a 
specified contingency. The social benefit of this assurance cannot be 
exaggerated. The operation of a stable and progressive modern society 
depends on these types of guarantees of repayment or replacement. 
The risk of misfortune is able to be spread by the entry of parties into 
insurance relationships. Members of society each pay a certain amount to 
provide money for the losses of an unfortunate few. It is unreasonable to 
expect the right to insurance to be waived, and to do so emphasises 
exceptional risk-taking which arguably should not be encouraged. 
3 Non-tangible 
The nature of insurance which offers a useful distinction is the inability to 
recognise any element of the promise as tangible. When insurance is 
purchased, a customer has nothing to expressly refer to except a policy 
document. What is purchased is protection for a contingency, and peace of 
mind that such protection will materialise. 
4 Complex 
The nature of insurance involves complex concepts and terminology which 
can result in confusion for the purchaser. The courts offer succinct guidelines 
to the existence of a legal insurance relationship,192 but the implications of 
such judicial pronouncements are negligible to the ordinary insured. It is 
possible that all but the most aware of customers will be oblivious to the 
precise contractual arrangement they are endorsing when entering into an 
insurance relationship.193 Arguably, consumer disputes would not arise if 
consumers received what they understood they were paying for.194 The 
proliferation of standard form insurance contracts provides an environment 
where customers accept terms which they have had little input in creating. 
This may be exacerbated by intentionally or accidentally withheld 
information. Non-disclosure in insurance contracts is recognised as a primary 
192Medical Defence Union v Department of Trade [1979] 2 All ER 421; The Motor Cycle Specialists 
Ltd v The Attorney General (1988) 5 ANZ Ins Cas 60-822. 
193 Manatu Kaihokohoko "Study of Insurance Practices" Ministry of Consumer Affairs 
(Wellington 1993). 
194 T Weir "Insurance Tomorrow" The Insurance Institute of New Zealand 1995 National 
Conference, 16. 
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cause of disputed claims. "Withheld, wrong, incomplete or otherwise 
misleading information is often the source of dispute ... Problems involving 
real or alleged misrepresentation or non-disclosure to a significant degree 
may be caused by a failure of communication between the parties."195 The 
complexity of the insurance relationship is not aided by the traditional notion 
of insurers,196 which suggests that much of the information offered to 
prospective policyholders is clouded in jargon and generic language. 
The nature of an insurer's business is to make money. The fundamental 
tension between insurer's and their clients arises from the 'money-for-
promise' arrangement. "All that an insurance company has to sell is its 
promise to pay. Yet, all other things being equal, the better an insurance 
company is at avoiding that promise, the more money it makes."197 
Insurance companies tell two different sets of stories about insurance at two 
distinct points in the insurance relationship. When marketing their services, 
companies tell expansive 'sales stories', which emphasise protection and 
appeal to a fear of limitless hidden dangers, suggesting that insurance will 
provide unlimited security.198 When handling claims, insurance companies 
tell 'claims stories' to a policyholder returning for an appraisal of the promise 
told in the first story. Claims stories "emphasise the limits of the contract and 
often ask the individual to sacrifice her needs for the benefit of the larger 
community of policyholders whose interests the insurer holds in public 
trust."199 
Of significance to this analysis is the fact that within this dichotemy of tales, 
the insured is not a dominant party. The balance of power may only allow the 
insured to function as a submissive party, either accepting stories as true, or 
rejecting them with few grounds for recourse. 
195 C Brown "Unfinished Business: Misrepresentation and Non--Disclosure in Insurance 
Proposals" 1994 15 NZULR 195. 
196 As alluded to above by Brash, above n137. 
197 T Baker "Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and 
Insurance Contract Damages" (1994) Texas Law Review, 1395, 1401. 
l98 D A Stone "Promises and the Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through Stories" 
(1994) Texas Law Review, 1435, 1436. 
199 Above n198, 1436. 
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There is no doubt that insurance consumers are involved in a unique and 
complex relationship. However, it is difficult to assert that insurance 
arrangements are sufficiently distinct from those arising in other commercial 
areas that special treatment is justified. For instance, is an insurance contract 
sufficiently different from, for instance, a banking contract. The banking 
consumer encounters standard forms, disguised fees and charges, and often 
will have only limited understanding of the complexities of an investment. 
The author submits that although insurance consumers can refer to some 
aspects of their relationship with an insurer as particularly unique, there are 
no sufficient reasons to suggest that such a distinction is so obvious as to 
justify creating specific treatment for insurance consumers in arbitration 
legislation.200 To do so could simply continue the practice of 'singling out', 
which the insurance industry and the Law Commission have regularly 
referred to as anomalous. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The author has attempted to show that the legislative reform initiated by the 
1975 committee and endorsed in the ILRA 1977 is fundamentally problematic. 
The 1977 insurance law reform package has been considered in two ways. The 
committee was concerned with the common mode in which insureds were 
forced into arbitration, and attempted to ameliorate this by making arbitration 
clauses ineffective. Although it has been suggested that their concern was 
Scott v Avery clauses, the committee recommended the rejection of all 
arbitration clauses. The second enquiry examined why the committee was 
concerned with insureds being involved in arbitration. The justifications of 
the committee for rejecting arbitration in insurance disputes have been 
analysed. 
After analysing the 1975 reasoning in this dual manner it is clear that the 
committee was significantlyconfused and misinformed. 
As a result of the misunderstandings in 1975 scetion 8 of the Insurance Law 
Reform Act 1977 was passed. It has been described how the effect of this 
200 The author suggests that the existence of seperate ombudsman schemes does not indicate 
that the two areas are distinctly polar, but simply developed out of the regulatory 
requirements at specific times. 
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prov1s10n m practice has implications far more extensive than simply 
guarding against Scott v Avery clauses. 
The New Zealand Law Commission has taken a significant step in repealing 
section 8, in the context of arbitration reform. Therefore, as a result, there 
exists a significantly revised stance on insurance dispute resolution. While the 
1977 reform included arbitration as simply a matter for consideration in 
neutralising a perceived imbalance in insurance contracts, modem reform has 
occurred in a converse manner, with insurance contracts being considered as 
a factor in the revitalisation of arbitration law. 
The developments in the research of the commission have been examined 
systematically. Of particular interest in relation to section 8 is the 
recommendation of a consumer arbitration agreement provision. Recent 
criticism of this proposal has provided the author with an opportunity to 
carefully examine the grounds on which clause 9 is justified. This has resulted 
in three general conclusions. 
Consumers are being presented, in the insurance context, as informed and 
capable parties. Although the author has expressed some apprehension over 
the feasibility of this assumption, it is suggested that this positive direction 
must be accepted. The Arbitration Bill, by allowing consumers to veto an 
arbitration agreement, clearly supports this emphasis. It is anticipated that the 
influence of the practice under the Consumer Arbitration Agreements Act 
1988 (UK), which has provided a model for the recommendation, may have a 
significant effect on the operation clause 9. 
A distinction between commercial and consumer parties has been shown to 
be a necessary feature of the insurance industry. Clause 9 is consistent with 
this trend. 
Although the features of the relationship between an insurer and a consumer 
insured can be considered unique in some circumstances, it is difficult to 
identify a sufficient difference between insurance consumers and general 
consumers to advocate a specific arbitration provision for consumer insureds. 
Therefore, as clause 9 is consistent with the general messages being expressed 
in the law of insurance, the author cannot accept the specific criticisms 
described above. Clause 9 is an empowering provision which emphasises the 
58 
autonomy of the parties. In its drafted form it offers positive encouragement 
to consumers to fortify themselves in the realtionship. 
An issue for the future, which the author anticipates will arise if clause 9 is 
included in arbitration legislation, relates to the possible unwillingness of 
consumers to endorse arbitration agreements in light of the establishment of 
the ISO office. The suggestion is that consumers may categorically reject all 
arbitration agreements if the ISO develops into a recognised, credible and 
cost-efficient service. This issue will need to be carefully monitored in the 
future. 
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